



# SECURITY POLICE

ANNUAL REPORT 2013

The author of the photos included in the Annual report is Security Police

# **Annual report**

## **about the activities of the Security Police in 2013**

Riga, May 2014



## Dear Reader,

Latvian Security Police (DP) is providing an evaluation of the national security perspective, and an overview of what was done in 2013 to identify and prevent risks related to national security. Taking into account the nature of national security and intelligence services, not all that was accomplished can be disclosed to the public. I am nevertheless convinced that this overview will facilitate understanding and promote discussions on the significant questions of national security. And this is exactly the goal of this annual report, to raise the level of understanding and boost the level of information in Latvian society on issues of national security and to offer as many answers as possible on the questions which pertain to the work of DP.



More than twenty years have elapsed since the time of the renewal of independence of the Republic of Latvia, and it's been already ten years since Latvia became a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). This year Latvia joined the Eurozone and next year will begin with Latvia's Presidency of the Council of the European Union. These facts unambiguously demonstrate Latvia's high level of integration in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. With such advantages, many of the residents of Latvia have developed a conviction that national security, freedom, and independence have become irreversible, and that they can take these values for granted. But events in Ukraine have diminished this confidence. National security issues which were not in the range of issues covered by the mass media have once again piqued an increased interest in Latvia's society.

If we compare the conditions of national security in 2013 with those we see today, we can frankly admit that last year was much more peaceful, stable, and predictable. In past times, it was not uncommon for national security and intelligence services to be accused of frightening the public with nonexistent external threats, but the latest international events have shown that the concerns we were expressing about various unfavourable trends in national security were indeed well-founded. In 2013, Latvia's national security was impacted in the most direct way by external processes, especially by Russia's efforts to strengthen influence over neighbouring countries, implementing "compatriot" policies, and using so-called *soft power* and economic instruments. Though this approach was perhaps not so clearly visible and evident as it is today, nonetheless the challenges that the trans-Atlantic community is now encountering, were not completely unforeseen, and for some time now political decisions have been taken bearing in mind the unfavourable trends reported by the national security and intelligence services. This once again proves just how essential it is for high-ranking government officials to be receiving advance and real-time information about internal and external security threats.

Rather often the questions addressed to DP arising in public space are of the kind: what has DP done to prevent threats? Why aren't the persons, also the ones mentioned in this report, tarnishing the image and discrediting Latvia, putting the statehood and national fundamental principles in doubt, imprisoned or extradited? The answer is as simple as that – Latvia is a democratic country where the principles of rule of law persist. The ones who have violated a law are brought to trial, however, those who are not charged are not imprisoned or deported in a democratic country. A wide range of legal, political, social, culture, informative and educating measures being beyond the scope of national security and intelligence services is needed in order to prevent the attempts of these persons who use seemingly democratic and political means to change the constitutional order of the country, split the society and support other countries in pursuing their interests in Latvia. It requires coordinated involvement and action of state and municipal institutions. The attitude of each and every Latvian resident is of great importance as well. Keeping distance from the attempts to split the society, avoidance of getting involved in provocations under the cover of democratic values is a significant counterreaction for any internal and external attempt to target the interests of Latvia.

The same as other Baltic countries, Latvia is a member state of NATO and EU which is the best guarantee to our security against external threats in all its history. Our security is at first the responsibility of ourselves, which means that by taking into account the developments in Ukraine, national security and intelligence services, other national institutions as well as society should be ready to react on new security situation. By improving the capacity to prevent and combat new national security challenges, in 2013 DP continued to develop and in cooperation with two other national security and intelligence services (Constitution Protection Bureau and Defence Intelligence and Security Service) as well as EU and NATO partner services contributed to strengthening the security situation in Latvia and Europe. At present, successful cooperation with Latvian and foreign partner services plays a significant role in respect of guaranteeing national security.

I would like to express my cordial gratefulness to our partners in Latvia as well as abroad for the support in the course of identifying and neutralizing mutual security risks. A special thanks goes to Latvian residents and their support which made a great contribution to work of DP. That the society supports DP has always been of great importance and we have respected it. Last but not least, I would like to thank all DP officers who continue completing their job responsibilities professionally thus strengthening the security, freedom and independence of our country with the commitment.



*Head of Security Police*  
**Jānis REINIKS**

# 1. Counterintelligence and protection of official secrets

The implementation of counterintelligence measures is set to be one of the greatest priority in the field of function of national security and intelligence services with the aim to prevent and counter the actions targeted by foreign security and intelligence services on the interests of Latvia.

## 1.1. The activities of foreign security and intelligence services in Latvia

Counterintelligence is the competence within which DP deals in a close cooperation with the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). By carrying out the counterintelligence measures within the scope of the competence, it is established that in 2013, the issues of interest of foreign security and intelligence services mainly encompassed political and economic processes in Latvia. As previous year, the issues of interest of foreign security and intelligence services were related to the domestic policy processes in Latvia, its membership in the EU and the NATO. Meanwhile, in 2013 some new tendencies in the course of actions of foreign security and intelligence services could be observed – a growing interest for the forthcoming Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the protection of the respective countries' economic interests in Latvia.

As a significant course of action in 2013 was also the organization of cooperation with the organisations and activists of diaspora in different regions in Latvia. No different as in the previous years, Russian security and intelligence services demonstrated their heightened intelligence capacity against Latvia's interests.

Latvian residents visiting the Russian Federation on a regular basis continually were the objects of operational interest. A special interest was paid to the persons involved in smuggling of excise goods. The residents of the Republic of Latvia being involved in smuggling are vulnerable when it comes to pressure or extortion, which makes them easy targets of recruitment by Russian security and intelligence services thus facilitating the acquisition of the information of their interest.

In 2013, another tendency coming to light was the organization of campaigns aimed to discredit Latvia in information space thus taking the continuous course of rhetoric declaring that Latvia is allegedly the place of "rebirth of Nazism" and "in a disastrous state of economics". In our assessment, Russian intelligence and security services are also involved in this campaign.



## 1.2. Protection of official secrets

In parallel to identification and prevention of threats posed by the activities of foreign security and intelligence services, within the field of counterintelligence DP deals with the protection of classified information. In order to enable the protection of sensitive information, DP carries out a range of activities. The ones to be highlighted are:

- Checks against officials requiring security clearance for work with official secrets and their compliance with the criteria stipulated by the law (based on the check results, it is considered whether the security clearance is or is not issued or the previous one possibly annulled).
- Checks against order of keeping and using official secrets to verify whether the requirements for the protection of classified information are met.
- Implementation of technical measures for conduction and prevention of non-sanctioned access or interception of official secrets by means of electronic devices.
- Briefing about counterintelligence risks and requirements for protection of official secrets of officials being issued security clearance for work with official secrets.

In 2013, DP issued 1253 second and third category security clearances for work with objects of official secrets, which correspond the classification level secret and confidential. By taking into account the fact that the first category security clearances (for top secret information) are issued by SAB, DP submitted 45 checks on persons to SAB for the consideration of issuing the security clearances for work with official secrets classified as top secret.

In 2013, DP rejected security clearance for official secret in 23 cases thus limiting the persons' rights to take particular positions which are related to the use of official secrets. Most often DP took a decision to reject the access to official secrets as the acquired information indicated that criminal liability was imposed on the person or the facts give the reason for impeachment of the person's credibility and the ability to keep official secrets. DP annulled 1784 security clearances for different reasons, for example, necessity for the security clearance of another category, change of position, etc.


In 2013, DP organised 60 checks on keeping and using official secrets. More than 20 seminars were held for briefing state officials about counterintelligence risks and requirements for protection of official secrets.

Last year, DP carried out checks against 13 companies who require industrial security certificate. Check materials for the issuing industrial security certificate for the decision-making were submitted to SAB. In two cases, based on the results of DP checks, the industrial security certificate was rejected.

The persons issued the security clearances are targeted by the foreign security and intelligence services as the information at their disposal is not available in public and raises interest. In order to gain the information of their interest, the agents of foreign security and intelligence services do not address or involve persons who possess the

security clearance for work with official secrets directly as the information can be acquired from their colleagues or acquaintances in case the person is reckless against the requirements for information protection and disclose sensitive information without any reason to the individuals who should not know the information.

### Dynamics of issued security clearances for work with official secrets



To recognize and prevent unauthorised collection of information by electronic devices, 134 times special technologies were used to check premises of the Parliament, the office of Minister President, premises of Cabinet of Ministers, Supreme

Court and Riga Regional Court as well as other national institutions. After the checks, several consultations were provided and recommendations for the responsible officials were prepared to improve the measures for information protection.

### Tendencies and forecasts

- In 2014, the activities of foreign security and intelligence services will probably increase. It will be even more enhanced both by the interest of foreign security and intelligence services for the elections of Latvian Parliament, and Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
- The elections of the Saeima, Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, tension in Russia's relations with Western countries will pose the risk of discrediting measures to increase within the information space in Latvia in 2014. Our service projects that the mass media in close relation to foreign authorities *inter alia* security and intelligence services will attempt to affect the choice of Latvian voters by enlisting non-critical support to their favourite political powers and tarnishing unfavourable ones.
- In relation to the preparation for the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union an opinion persists that foreign security and intelligence services will intensify both open and covert information collection measures among Latvian officials.
- It is likely that foreign security and intelligence services will continue using compatriot organisations for the enforcement of their geopolitical interests in Latvia.
- In 2014, the persons from Latvia involved in organising smuggling of excise goods will still be targets of foreign security and intelligence services in order to obtain information.



## 2. Protection of constitutional order

Protection of constitutional order encompasses measures for ensuring Latvian sovereignty, constitutional order and territorial integrity. In this respect, in 2013 DP performed activities aimed at identification and prevention of threats posed by persons, organisations and foreign subjects whose declared or real goals threatened the constitutional order of the state. Consequently, the highest state officials and responsible government institutions were informed about conducted threats. Legal framework gaps were identified as well as other legal instruments were used to limit and eliminate identified risks.

### 2.1. Russian compatriot policy

In 2013, Russia's implemented compatriot policy and their supporters in Latvia posed the most significant risks to the constitutional order. Russia's officially declared aim of compatriot policy is to support their compatriots including the defence of their interests and rights in their place of residence or to promote their return to Russia. Meanwhile, under the respective political cover, Russia carries out activities for the implementation of geopolitical interests abroad, as well as attempts to affect foreign *inter alia* Latvian domestic policy processes by involving compatriot organisations to reach their goals. In the light of above-mentioned, Russia's implemented compatriot policy poses threats to the national security.

In 2013, the priorities and the approaches of Russia's implemented compatriot policy along with the rhetoric changed from highlighting the "cooperation with compatriots" to the "support for compatriots and protection of rights", which lately dominates also in the information space. This change in course is aimed to emphasize the persistent opinion declaring alleged "compatriot discrimination" and "violation of human rights of compatriots" abroad. Russian aggressive and regular statements against the Baltic States, accusing them of alleged "violation of compatriot rights" and "glorification of Nazism" even more exemplify the change of course. The taken course was also enhanced on the international stage, *in such* organisations as UNO, EDSCO, European Council, in order to elicit response internationally thus stealing the scene from the human rights violations in Russia. Russian report on human rights situation in the countries of the EU was used for the same aim as hereof. The concentration on compatriot rights protection and the expansion of the activities on international stage can be assessed as an attempt of deploying it as a public diplomatic instrument, which would make it complicated to doubt the diplomatic legitimacy and covert interference in the domestic policy of other countries by justifying it with humanitarian aims.


The information at the disposal of DP reveals that under the period of review, the financial system of the compatriot policy was centralised, particularly, the financial sources were limited, however the financial funding increased and its flow became more regular. At the same time, in the end of 2013,

several legislative initiatives regarding compatriot policy were still on the table of Russian Duma.

In 2013, several Russian institutions played a great role in the implementation process of compatriot policy. For instance, the federal national agency *Rossotrudnichestvo* gained the rights to control the budget for compatriot policy under the government order. The rights are equal to those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation, which by clearly defining operational field of *Rossotrudnichestvo* makes it to one of the most significant players of compatriot policy. The agency was given the task to support the compatriot organisations

by planning and coordinating the events. Russian MFA in turn was responsible for the consolidation of compatriots, general coordination and the development of the younger generation's loyalty to Moscow. As another activity of *Rossotrudnichestvo* noteworthy is the proposal to establish a foundation for the support of Russian-language mass media abroad.

Further to the reforms concerning the authorisation of the subjects of implementing Russian compatriot policy, under the subordination of Russian MFA and *Rossotrudnichestvo*, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Compatriots Living Abroad strengthened its position as the main compatriot financial source. In addition, the terms and order for obtaining the finances have faced changes. The Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Compatriots Living Abroad provides finances in a tender based on a contract, which requires a report concerning the activities to be submitted thus making the compatriots responsible for the finances they have obtained and gives space for controlling its use. In 2013, other funds such as *Russkiy Mir* and *Fund Gorchakov* involved in the implementation of Russian compatriot policy kept functioning.



In October 2013, the mass media of the USA published the information regarding the investigation carried out by Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the youth traveling from the USA to Russia, which was organised by *Rossotrudnichestvo*. Even though officially the intention of the visit was to establish contacts between the residents of both countries, the investigation questions their possible selection as potential candidates for a cooperation with the Russian security and intelligence services. It in turn points at a risk that *Rossotrudnichestvo* equally to other compatriot policy institutions can be also used for the interests of Russian security and intelligence services.

## 2.2. Indications of the implementation of Russian compatriot policy in Latvia

The aims and the tasks of the implementation of Russian compatriot policy in Latvia in 2013 were continually promoted with the help of several non-governmental organisations and their representatives. However, a great role in the coordination and supervision of the implementation of Russian compatriot policy was played by the diplomatic residences, which in 2013 strengthened their role as coordinators and supervisors of compatriot policy in Latvia.

The activity of non-governmental organisations related to the implementation of Russian compatriot policy, as it was before, was aimed against the integrity of Latvian society and diminishing the sense of belonging to Latvia of Russian speaking residents in Latvia. It is being done in order to segregate the national minorities in Latvia from the rest of the society. By presenting themselves as advocates, the respective organisations could use Latvian residents to reach their as well as Russian political goals.

Notwithstanding the mutual disagreements and struggle for financial sources allocated by Russia for the implementation of compatriot policy in Latvia, in 2013 the activity of compatriot organisations and the sympathisers has remained the same as in previous years. The positions among the activists of compatriot policy were still strengthened by widely known key figures of compatriot policy or so-called professional compatriots. The persons involved in the compatriot policy personally benefit from it and their activities are carried out in accordance with Russian foreign policy interests in Latvia. However, the generation gap between *professional compatriots* whose most famous representatives are Viktor Guscin, Aleksandr Gaponenko and Josif Koren and the youngest generation of compatriot policy activists is evident. At the same time in 2013, Valery Kravcov strengthened his positions becoming the leader of Russian community in Latvia.

## The activities of Aleksandr Gaponenko

In 2013, one of the most active representatives of Russian compatriot policy in Latvia was Aleksandr Gaponenko, occupying himself with the promotion of the narrative of the Second World War in Latvia in accordance with the Russian understanding of history. He also attempted to popularise the opinion of alleged



A. Gaponenko

“discrimination of ethnic minorities” in Latvia. Before the events of 16 March, A. Gaponenko together with Nikolaj Kabanov, the deputy of the Saeima, created a film “Ostland. Night under the swastika”, which gained the second place in a competition “Russian compatriots: “We have rights!”” and brought them recognition in Russia. Moreover, in the second half of the year, with the support of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad and the Protection Fund, A. Gaponenko published a book “Ethnic conflicts in the Baltic States. Post-Soviet period”, where the biased information of prevailing ethnic pressure in Latvia and the Baltic States dominates. Meanwhile, A. Gaponenko kept spreading biased and false information regarding the domestic policy issues in our country. By representing himself as an “expert” and “researcher” of the political and economic processes, A. Gaponenko artificially attempted to create an impression of the Russian-speaking residents being threatened in Latvia. In addition, by means of different publications he attempted to activate the idea of autonomy of Latgale (the region in the East of Latvia, near the border with Russia). The information published by A. Gaponenko is often used by Russian institutions and information resources such as REGNUM, in order to spread critics and condemnation against Latvia. In 2013, A. Gaponenko still maintained good cooperation with Bronislav Zelcerman, who as an organiser of the leadership training raised the young generation of compatriot policy activists – Elizabete Krivcova, Margarita Dragile, Jelena Bacinska etc. The work divided between B. Zelcerman and A. Gaponenko in the educational process of the young generation of compatriot policy leaders is one of the factors which enables the young ones to be notable among other youth. B. Zelcerman is responsible for the methodological and systematic youth educational process, while A. Gaponenko involves the youth in the compatriot policy activities. It is noteworthy that A. Gaponenko has become active in the Latvian energy sector and attempted to promote the interests of Russian business in the Baltic States.

## Latvian Council of Civic Organisations (LCCO)

LCCO was founded in 1998, which was meant to serve as a platform for discussions for the needs of Russian-friendly civic organisations in Latvia. Even though the organisation has a long lasting history, it is neither registered officially yet nor it has a legal status in Latvia. The genuine aims and purposes of the organisation are



*V.Guscins*

ambiguous as the registration of the organisation officially lacks for many years. At the same time, it strives for the status of the main coordinator of compatriot policy. Formally, approximately 90 different organisations have become members of LCCO, however no more than 20 of those were active in 2013. Since 2007, the activities of LCCO are coordinated by V. Guscins. Under his leadership, the organisation has attempted to expand its operational aims – not only to promote the discussions and consolidation of different organisations, but also to become a coordinator of the compatriot policy in Latvia. However, it did not work well for him and in 2013 this non-registered structure was deployed as an informal discussion platform with a limited capacity to coordinate the activities of other organisations. LCCO kept organising monthly “coordination” meetings in 2013, primarily in the Moscow House in Riga. By assessing the activities of LCCO, it should be highlighted that V. Guscins is the leader of the Coordination Council of Russian compatriot policy organisations established by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Latvia and Latvian representative in the World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots, which enables Russia to have impact on LCCO activities as well as its agenda.



## Non-Citizens' Congress (Nepilsoņu kongress)

In 2013, so-called social movement Non-Citizens' Congress kept acting as a non-registered organisation, which enables this organisation to avoid the limitations stipulated by law for the activities of social organisations *inter alia* to provide the transparency of financial activities. From the name/ title of the organisation, it could be concluded that the aim of Non – citizens' Congress is to deal with non-citizen issues, however, in real, its range of activities is far more expanded.

During the period of this review, Non-Citizens' Congress was one of the most significant projects within the implementation of compatriot policy. Its establishment fully complies with the interests of Russia to highlight the “problems” of non-citizens and to activate the issue of “offences of human rights” within international institutions. The activities of Non-Citizens' Congress also comply with the interests of the political ambitions of some members of it as the activation of non-citizen issues promotes the popularity of activists before the elections of the European Parliament and the Saeima. For instance, Elizabete Krivcova, the leader of Non-citizens' Congress and the member of the political party “Harmony” (“Saskaņa”) applied for the elections for the European Parliament.



*E.Krivcova*

In order to draw the attention to the issue of non-citizens, Non-citizens' Congress turned to different leaders of international organisations, for example, UNO General Secretariat, the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the Commission of the European Council. Non-citizens' Congress created a web page [www.noncitizens.eu](http://www.noncitizens.eu), visited several foreign embassies in Latvia, organised events covering the issue of non-citizens next to the European Parliament building and organised other activities as well. It should be pointed that the international activities of Non-citizens' Congress are well coordinated and considered thoroughly, which, in turn, fostered its cooperation with public relations agencies “Bell Pottinger”, one of the biggest in the United Kingdom.

Public relations agency “Bell Pottinger” (hereinafter - BP) was founded in 1998. The headquarters of the agency is located in London, however it has departments in Eurasia and Near Eastern countries. BP activities are assessed ambiguously as for many years the company deals with the publicity campaigns of persons and political regimes controversially assessed. This is the reason why BP has undergone the critics for the cooperation with non-democratic regimes and persons accused of offences of human rights. The attention should be paid also to BP's cooperation with different subjects involved in areas of Russian energy, mineral deposits sectors and banks.

In 2013, Non-citizens' Congress attempted to gain support for their ideas also in Latvian audience (the web page contains a section in Latvian) and tried to participate in domestic policy debates by organising a discussion on the project of Constitution preamble. It is of significance that the approach of Non-citizens' Congress was also adopted in Estonia, which allows to foresee that in the future Non-citizens' Congress and Estonian analogue activities will be coordinated for reaching the maximum effect.

## So called Antifascist organisations

In 2013, a significant role in Latvia's discrediting measures both on national and international level played also so-called antifascist organisations, which attempted to popularise the myth created by Russia stating the "rebirth and glorification of fascism in Latvia". The ones active in tarnishing the image of Latvia is the Russian influence organisation "World without Nazism" (hereinafter – WWN)



J.Korens

and its supporters. In order to create the image of honourable international movement, WWN attempted to involve international organisations in their activities.

During last year, Valery Engel, the coordinator for the WWN activities in Eastern Europe, as well as Josif Koren, the actual leader of the association "Latvian Antifascist Committee", played a great role in the discrediting campaign against Latvia carried out by so called antifascist movement. The particular campaign was based on spreading biased and false information about alleged rebirth of Nazism as well as attempts to impose Russian interpretation about the history of the liberalisation of Latvia from fascism after the Second World War.

Last year, during the events of 16 March (Latvian Legionary Commemoration day), J. Koren and other so-called Latvian antifascists participated in their traditional activities, the aim of which was to popularize the myth of "glorification of fascism" internationally. In 2013, J. Koren organised also the delegation in order to discredit Latvia during OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw. From 9 to 12 August 2013 in Alūksne, J. Koren coordinated WWN and "Baltic Antifascist" organisations meeting in which the discussion of the promotion of recognition of antifascist movements was held, also how to enhance the number of members and improve public image, as well as popularize the myth of "growing tendency of neo-Nazism and nationalism in Baltics".

### "For native language"

After the fiasco in municipal elections, which confirmed the weak support in society, the organisation "For native language" (hereinafter – FNL) split in the end of 2013.

V. Linderman together with some of the supporters attempting to increase the popularity of himself and "FNL", in December 2013 took up the gathering of signatures for the amendments in Children's Rights Protection Law with the aim to forbid "gay propaganda". For the popularisation of this initiative in society, V. Linderman created a new association "Let's protect our

children". V. Linderman's initiative gained some publicity thanks to his contacts in mass media as well as attracted some representatives of religious confessions, for instance, Kaspars Dimiteris.

The activists once linked to V. Linderman, took an independent course of actions. Illarions Girss and Yevgeny Osipov founded the association "Russkaya Zarya" by purposefully using norms of liberal legislation. It is planned that the foundation of this organisation would enable to allocate financial support and to legitimize the actions carried out in Latvia by applying to the support programs for organisations established in Russia and Western countries. In 2013, I. Girss attempted to strengthen the cooperation with the political party "Latvian Russian Union" founded by Tatjana Zdanoka by searching for the possibility to stand in the elections for the European Parliament from the respective party's electoral list. Apart from this, I. Girss engaged in the confrontation with so-called *professional compatriots*, for instance, A. Gaponenko. The conflict can be assessed as a struggle for the funding allocated by Russian institutions, which is stated by the argument of weak gain of received resources from so-called *professional compatriots*. It shall be noticed that the suspicion of the embezzlement of funding allocated by the Russian institutions prevailed among the activists of compatriot policy also in this period of review.

I. Girss and J. Osipovs are at the forefront of the Russian radical nationalism in Latvia. As the possibility to gain publicity in Latvian broadcast mass media as well as print mass media in the Russian language was limited, in 2013 they intensively published provocative statements in social networks and Russian mass media which rather often complied with the official rhetoric of Russia.

In 2013, evident activities regarding Russian compatriot policy were carried out by other organisations – associations "Rodina" and "Latvian Human Rights Committee" of (the International Federation for Human Rights) as well as by the organisations active in the regions of Latvia, such as "Russian Community in Liepāja", "Russian Community of Ventspils", "Veche Society of Russian Culture in Jelgava" and association "KISLOROD" in Daugavpils.



I.Girss

### 2.3. Right-wing extremism

In 2013, the level of threat to constitutional order of right-wing extremists was relatively low in Latvia. Even though several persons and organisations belonging to this particular extremist direction continued their activities, they did not get support in society and there was a lack of supporters and financial resources for implementation of significant activities.



During the last year, the activities of Gustavs Celmiņš Centre (GCC) reduced as a result of investigation carried out by DP against GCC leader Igor Siskin. After GCC leader's detention, other activists of the association turned to cooperation with other marginal powers, for example, association "Antiglobālisti" and organisation "Latvijas Aizsargi". The only public campaign during 2013 was the participation in solidarity picket which expressed the support for Greek political party "Golden Dawn". The reduction of intensive actions of GCC after the detention of I. Siskin once more proves that the activities of extremist organisations in Latvia primarily depend on the action capacity of their leader.

In 2013, some other neo-Nazi oriented informal groups still existed in Latvia which basically did not show their active functioning or engagement in violent attacks. At the same time, at the beginning of 2013 the information regarding Maxim Marcinkevic, the leader of the former neo-Nazi group "Format 18" based in Russia and his arrival to Riga was acquired. The information at our disposal indicated that his intentions were of provocative character, which lead to the decision to prevent him from arriving to Latvia and in the result of cooperation with other responsible public authorities was ensured.

Neo-Nazi group's "Format 18" former leader Maxim Marcinkevic is one of the most known representative of far-right extremists in Russia. After the release from imprisonment for incitement to national hatred, M. Marcinkevic keeps supporting the far-right ideology as well as violence by founding non-formal movement "Restrukt" and by organising different campaigns. The most famous one is "Okkupay-pedofilyay", which has formed a network in the territory of the Russian Federation. The activists of the movement launch violent and humiliating attacks against homosexuals later representing the video recordings on the Internet.

By carrying out the research of the activities of movements supporting right extremism ideology, DP has established that some sympathisers of the respective movements have become engaged in fan clubs of different sports. Their engagement in sports fan clubs has not significantly had an impact on their posed threats to the national security and public order, however, there are some examples in other European countries which show that this tendency can expand the number of the supporters of far-right extremists and increase the risk of incidents motivated by violent ideology.

The association "Latvian National Front" (Latvijas Nacionālā Fronte) led by Aivars Garda in 2013 was not publicly active, however it continued limited informative activities. For the expression of their opinion, the association used the Internet resources, mainly their own webpage as well as it published its own newspaper "RDD" (Reoccupation. Decolonization. Debolshevisation)

### 2.4. Left-wing extremism

In 2013, the left-wing extremists did not enjoy significant support in Latvia and DP did not establish any noteworthy activities carried out by neither persons, groups of persons nor organisations supporting it. Just like right-wing extremists, also left-wing extremists lack the support of society as well as intellectual and financial resources for realisation of their ideas. One of the activities carried out by the supporters of left-wing ideology during 2013 was the protest campaign in relation to the situation in Syria held next to the Embassy of France in Latvia. The event was attended by Beness Aijo, who in September 2013 visited the meeting of Eduard Limonov's political organisation "Drugaya Rossiya" in Moscow and he positioned himself as the representative of the residents of Latvia, Great Britain and Palestinian Self-Government and drew the attention to the issue of non-citizens in Latvia. In addition, B. Aijo has told mass media that when being in the territory of Palestinian Self-Government, he has attended a military camp. It is to emphasize that some organisations included in the list of terrorist organisations created by the EU are based there.



B.Aijo

## Tendencies and forecasts

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- In 2014, the intensity of Russian compatriot policy implemented will likely increase and will still pose the most significant threats to state constitutional order. Just like previously, Russia will continue with the discrediting campaigns abroad and within international institutions. At the same time, they will attempt to use Latvian residents for the implementation of their geopolitical interests.
- It could be expected that compatriot organisations in Latvia will also play a significant role in the promotion of Russia's geopolitical goals. Notwithstanding personal ambitions and struggle for the resources allocated to the implementation of compatriot policy, the compatriot organisations in Latvia will attempt to draw the attention to the issues guided by Russia.
- There are reasonable grounds for believing that compatriot policy activists in Latvia, who will stand for the Saeima elections in 2014, in order to draw more public attention to their personality could get engaged in provocative campaigns. These campaigns most likely will be oriented on the segregation of society and reduction of the sense of belonging to Latvia.
- The intensity of the activities of the supporters of far-right and far-left ideology in 2014 most probably will be low. Even though the possibility of the right-wing or left-wing extremists' involvement in violent activities cannot be excluded, at present there are no grounds to consider, that in the near future they will pose a significant threat to the national security.

### 3. The security of information space

Systematic and coordinated propaganda, disinformation and dissemination of biased information about Latvia with the aim to segregate the society, to destroy the sense of belonging to Latvia, to doubt state sovereignty and the legitimacy of independence cause significant threats to national security.

In 2013, the expansion of stereotypes and myths according to Russian geopolitical interests in Latvian information space was evident. No different as in the previous years, in 2013 Russia actively used information space in order to spread the information discrediting Latvia. For several years already, the opinion of alleged “rebirth of Fascism and its glorification” and “violation of Russian-speaking rights” in Latvia was intensively spread, at the same time denying occupation of Latvia in 1940. In parallel, the positive input of the USSR in the development of Latvia is praised more often lately and the biased information about the current situation in Latvia is shown. The goal of these propaganda measures is to have a long-term impact on the opinion of the audience of Russian mass media in Latvia to reach a positive opinion about Russia among Latvian residents.

To promote the expansion of these myths and stereotypes, the informative resources supporting Russia and being controlled by Russia actively publish the opinions of “the right” experts and politicians. Moreover, a wide range of them has become “experts” and “specialists” thanks to mass media. This is how the credibility of the opinion of many compatriot policy’s activists, given the status of “expert”, is increased artificially once being published

in the mass media and thus having more significant impact on the audience.

Not only play mass media a significant role in the realisation of Russian propaganda events, but also different research institutions and social science researchers loyal to Russia. They are the ones filling the information space with opinions, researches, publications and documentaries complying with Russian interests.

In 2013, one of the most obvious examples of realised informative events in the Russian mass media against the Baltic States was a story representing the tragic developments in Vilnius in 1991 in biased and unilateral way. This story demonstrates how the information space was used for disinformation with the aim to deny the offences conducted by the USSR against the civilians of the Baltic States and question their legitimacy.

During the last year, the international media club “Format A3” continued their activities, which organised several discussions by inviting renowned persons among Russian society and academic world. The ones forming the core audience were the activists of LSOP (Latvian Civic organisations Council) and compatriot policy. The majority of the discussion establishes the point of view regarding international processes as well as developments in Latvia which corresponds with and is beneficial to Moscow.

Last year, a great role in the field of the informative activities realised by Russia played the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University’s project ruBaltic.ru. This is one of the most relevant Russian information influence resource aimed against Latvia and the Baltic States together. By using “the right” experts, generated as an “analytical portal”, it creates beneficial geopolitical viewpoint on social, historical and political processes in the Baltic Sea region. The portal has a network covering a vast number of contacts among compatriot activists as well as representatives of Latvian academic world.

One of the most visible resources creating Russian-speaking residents’ position and the exchange of viewpoints was “imhoclub.lv”, an Internet portal launched in 2011. It covers a wide range of topics. Primarily, the publications support Russia and criticise Latvia thus supplementing Russia’s informative activities in Latvia in order to mobilise Russian compatriots and to spread statements according to Russian interests. In order to facilitate the expansion of the ideas also in Latvian-speaking audience, in 2013 a Latvian version of the portal was created where the articles in Russian are translated into Latvian and original publications or re-published articles appealing to a potential Latvian reader are provided.



## Tendencies and forecasts

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- Russian activities targeted on the influence of Latvian public opinion in accordance with Russian geopolitical interests, are becoming more intensive. It is foreseen that Russia will continue using Latvian information space in order to affect Latvian domestic policy processes.
  - Russian informative activities can become even more intensive prior the elections of the Saeima and the Latvian presidency in the European Council with the aim to increase the support for the political powers sympathising Russia.
- Projections cannot be excluded that the myths and stereotypes regarding the “violation of the rights of non-citizens and national minorities”, “limitation of the use of the Russian language”, “rebirth of Fascism” in Latvia will still be spread throughout the information space. The activists of compatriot policy in Latvia will play a significant role by attempting to popularise Russian rhetoric in order to segregate the society and lessen Latvian residents’ link to our country.



## 4. Economic security

One of the most significant priorities of national security is to guarantee the economic security. The risks to the national security interests are posed by the attempts of separate countries to use economic instruments as means to reach their foreign policy interests in our country and to affect domestic policy processes in Latvia. The information at the disposal of DP indicates that some foreign security and intelligence services show a growing interest about the economic activities of their country's businessmen in Latvia.

In 2013, the issue of state energetic sovereignty remained topical. The fact that Latvia depends on the supply of Russian energy resources, makes the national economy of Latvia vulnerable, which in turn increases the risk that Russia could use Latvia's dependence on the supply of energy resources in order to reach their foreign policy goals.

Russia kept conducting activities to maintain its geopolitical and economic impact in the Baltic Sea region, also in Latvia, thus promoting the development of their preferable projects and attempting to prevent the launch of such projects which would provide alternative for Russian natural gas to the Baltic States. In 2013, some Russian companies actively attempted to maintain the existing positions in Latvian natural gas market and conducted some informative campaigns in relation to postponement of liberalisation of natural gas market and cared for favourable decisions to be made, in order to prevent from the establishment of alternative supply sources. By lobbying their interests, the companies used several Latvian companies, experts, journalists and opinion leaders of as effective channels for forming public opinion and influencing decision-making process.

The influx of foreign investments in Latvia is a significant factor for the development of economics. However, not always new vacancies offered to Latvian residents, manufacturing of export goods, provision of services come along with the business activities of foreign investors. The risks to the national economic security are posed right then when Latvian companies strategically significant for the national economy get under the control of foreign country (especially under the control of company possessed by a foreign country), which rather often uses economic instruments for pursuing their geopolitical interests. When the foreign economic presence in the strategically important fields in Latvia increase, the capacity to use them for the interests of these countries grows too, which enables to affect the domestic policy decisions in Latvia to be made in accordance with their foreign policy goals.

Latvian transit industry, which is formed by three major ports and the railway is one of the most important industries for Latvian economics. The handling of Russian cargos and transit cargos of other countries through Russia provides significant income to Latvian transit industry as well as significantly raises Latvian income. That Latvian transit industry to high extent depends on transportation and reloading of Russian energy resources (coal, petroleum, and oils) is a great factor of posing threats to the competition of transit industry in the Baltic States region as well as implicitly to the security of national economy. To diminish the threats, a diversification of cargo suppliers, their kinds and segments, as well as the country of their origin is necessary. The tendencies observed in 2013 indicate that in spite of some diversification attempts, the projects that could



increase the aforementioned risks in the transit industry are still developed. For example, the plans to provide reloading of coal from Russia in Latvian ports on a long-term basis is controversial to the lately implemented Russian policy to develop their ports and railway infrastructure there in order to provide the reloading of their cargos in the respective ports. The capacity of Russian ports enables to decrease the load transportation through Latvian transit corridor significantly and at any moment.

Along with the amendments of Immigration Law coming into force on 1 July of 2010, DP carried out thorough checks of those foreigners, who are appealed by so-called *investor's program* to gain temporary residence permit in Latvia. The aim of these checks is to prevent the residence permits to be issued to those persons who pose a threat to the interests of national security of Latvia. To conclude where the financial capital originates from, DP maintains a close cooperation with Office for Prevention of the Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity of General Prosecutor's Office and foreign partners.


In 2013, the number of applications for temporary residence permits stipulated by the Article 23 the Immigration Law increased significantly. Compared to 2012, when DP conducted checks of

2921 persons based on applications submitted, in 2013 the number of people embraced 4506 persons. Temporary residence permits were issued primarily on the grounds of investments in property (3683 persons). There were less persons applying for a residence permit on the grounds of the investments in stock capitals of companies (569 persons) and investments in bank subordinated capital (254 persons).

As the number of residence permits constantly grows, the capacity of national security and intelligence services to ensure thorough checks of applicants for residence permits should be strengthened as well. It is even more important because the possibilities that cannot be excluded within this system are:

- the permit has gained a person related to foreign security and intelligence services;
- the person issued a residence permit gets engaged in financing activities aimed against the interests of the security of Latvia;
- the money of unclear origin flows into economic sectors of strategic significance;
- the permit is obtained by a person who is involved in organised crime or terrorist groups.

### Dynamics of residence permit applications



At the same time, there were some cases detected that companies controlled by investors from third countries express their interest and attempt to allocate the revenues from the EU funding, which are meant for the development of business

activities. It poses the risk that the benefits brought by the entrepreneurship are enjoyed by the third countries excluding Latvia and EU economics.

## Tendencies and forecasts

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- Dependence on one energy resources supplier increases not only the vulnerability of economics but also expands the possibilities of suppliers to affect Latvian domestic and foreign policy.
- It can be expected that Russia will still be interested to keep its dominant position in the sector of the provision of energy resources in Latvia and with different political, economic and informative instruments will attempt to hinder the development of solution to alternative energy resources supply.
- The risks to national security are posed by Latvian companies of strategic significance being under foreign

control, which could be used as an instrument for the pursuing of foreign policy interests in Latvia. The interest of foreign countries for Latvian economy industries of strategic significance will not diminish and some countries will continually be ready directly or indirectly take control over Latvian companies of strategic significance.

- The interest of foreign countries regarding the temporary residence permits in Latvia will be current, that is why DP will pay serious attention to the checks of applicants of residence permits in order to prevent the possibility that this system is used against the interests of the security of Latvia.

## 5. Counterterrorism

The responsibilities of DP within the scope of counterterrorism covers the intelligence collection and analysis about terrorism risk subjects, preventive neutralisation of potential terrorism risks and coordination of state and municipal institutions' as well as other legal entities' cooperation within the field of counterterrorism.

In 2013, DP continued monitoring relevant terrorism threats by obtaining operational information as well as by analysing and processing the information shared by foreign partner services, institutions involved in national counterterrorism activities and critical infrastructure objects. Last year, continuous exchange of information and cooperation with foreign partner services, NATO and EU counterterrorism institutions was ensured.

### 5.1. Terrorism threat assessment in Europe

International terrorism threat assessment indicates that in 2013 the most significant terrorism threat to the security of Europe was posed by European Islamists (inter alia, from Scandinavian countries geographically close to Latvia) travelling to Syria and joining Islamist terrorist groups based there. This tendency causes both immediate and long-term terrorism risks due to a credible possibility that after their return from Syria, European Islamists could engage in terrorism-related activities in Europe. Islamists from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also engaged in armed conflict in Syria, which poses a potential long-term terrorism threat to these countries as well. It should be noted that there is a tendency which indicates that in the last few years Islamists originating from former USSR countries actively engage in violent activities in other regions and that mutual contacts increase.

Meanwhile, the security situation in other world regions became worse – there were terrorist attacks committed against European citizens in several countries with significant terrorist group presence.

In 2013, the role of the Internet grew in expanding terrorism threats in Europe. At present, in virtual world is a wide range of information promoting radicalisation as well as instructions to the persons willing to travel to the conflict regions and/or commit terrorist attacks in their places of residence.



*TJ missionaries*

### 5.2. Terrorism threat assessment in Latvia

Terrorism threat level in Latvia did not change significantly and remained relatively low in 2013. There were no terrorist attacks or any other terrorism-related criminal offences in Latvia. At the same time, several factors were identified which could increase terrorism risk in the future. The situation in relation to right-wing and left-wing extremism was covered in the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter of this report that is why this section will cover the issue of religious radicalisation risks.

Just as in previous years, also in 2013 foreign missionaries of Tabligh Jamaat (TJ), a controversial international missionary movement which preaches orthodox interpretation of Islam came to Latvia. The activities of TJ in Latvia have not facilitated violence or direct terrorism threats so far. However, in 2013 the representatives of the movement have encouraged Latvian Muslim community representatives to go on a pilgrimage to the countries where the presence of terrorist groups is significant. The experience of the European countries indicates that the interpretation of Islam preached by this movement is contradictory to Western democracy's values because it promotes the isolation of Muslims from the rest of the society and development of even more radical beliefs. The analysis of the tendencies of terrorism also indicates that travelling to the regions with a significant number of Islamist terrorist groups can further the influence of violent ideology preached by these groups on particular Muslims.

Even though the leadership of Latvian Muslim community has changed, TJ visits still did not get a vast support in Latvian Muslim community. The new leadership of Latvian Islamic Culture Centre (LICC), which was taken over by Latvian Chechen Community representatives (the leader – Arbi Indarbajev), attempted to keep the distance from the activities which could be characterised as radical. However, during the period of review LICC was finally able to purchase a building to settle a mosque in it. The purchase of the building was financed from different sources which primarily derived from the organisations based in the countries from the Persian Gulf region. The experience of the European countries indicates that along with the allocation of funding the organisations from this region usually attempt to spread their interpretation of Islam, inter alia, to popularise Wahhabism. It is one of the most radical interpretations of Islam and its principles are contrary to democratic values and conception of secularism and human rights in Europe.

During the last several years Latvian Muslim community has organised some international events. In 2013, international events on religious education took place in Latvia, which were attended both by Latvian and foreign Muslims and during these events lectures were held by local as well as foreign lecturers (inter alia the ones supporting radical interpretation of Islam).

It should be stressed, that some representatives of Latvian Muslim community, including converts, in 2013 continued their studies in the regions where terrorist groups are present. The

analysis of terrorism tendencies indicates that long-term presence in these regions can promote acceptance of radical interpretation of Islam or even establishment of contacts with the members of terrorist groups located there. It in turn can negatively affect Latvian security interests after the return of these individuals.

### 5.3. Coordination of Counterterrorism Measures

In 2013, DP continued implementing preventive counterterrorism measures, working on counterterrorism response plans, ensuring the control of physical security measures in the terrorism risk objects and conducting briefings to personnel of institutions involved in counterterrorism activities.

One of the most important activities in the field of planning of counterterrorism, preventive measures in 2013 was the review of National Counterterrorism Plan and its approval by the Cabinet of Ministers. The aim of the plan is to set up the preventive counterterrorism measures carried out by the subjects of national counterterrorism system in accordance with four terrorism threat levels.

In addition, in the field of the security control of terrorism risk objects, more than 30 objects of critical infrastructure and soft targets were inspected. On the grounds of the results gained during the inspection, more than 90 assessments and recommendations in relation to the readiness to prevent terrorism threats and reduce the possible negative impact were submitted. In the field of the security control of soft targets, it can be mentioned that DP officers were involved in the planning and coordination

process of counterterrorism measures implemented in Nordea Riga marathon and XXV Latvian Song and XV Dance Festival.


At the same time, in 2013 briefings on counterterrorism issues were held in several institutions, such as National Armed Forces, State Emergency Medical Service, State Fire and Rescue Service etc.

### 5.4. Migration from the countries with significant terrorist group presence

In accordance with Latvian legislation, additional checking is performed when applying for a visa or residence permit, for the persons travelling from the terrorism risk countries. During 2013, DP performed the additional checking of 1083 invitations (1655 persons were checked) and reviewed 1015 visa applications. In 2013, no attempts of members of terrorist groups to enter Latvian territory have been detected.

The analysis of the dynamics of all the asylum seekers in 2013, shows that compared to the previous year, their number has diminished. Overall, the checks on asylum seekers in 2013 covered only 171 cases. The majority of them were from Georgia – 133 persons, however amongst them were also some from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, Palestinian Self-Government as well as the citizens of Iran, Nigeria and Morocco. There is still a tendency which indicates that the citizens of other countries, such as Morocco or Algeria portray themselves as Syrian citizens hoping that such activity would facilitate the reception of the status of an asylum seeker and avoiding their deportation.

The dynamics of the number of asylum seekers



## Tendencies and forecasts

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
- The terrorism threat level in Latvia during the last year has not changed and is evaluated as low. It is foreseen, that the terrorism threat level in the near future will not change significantly, although there are some indications of possible long-term risks. At present, the most significant threat to Latvian residents comes from their presence in the terrorism risk regions where Europeans are amongst the prioritised targets of terrorist attack.
- In 2013, radical interpretation of Islam did not gain support in Latvian Muslim community, however the increasing contacts with foreign Muslims including sympathisers of radical interpretation of Islam, in future can promote the risks of radicalisation also in Latvian Muslim community. More active engagement of religious organisations supporting radical interpretation of Islam in Latvian Muslim community can also facilitate the acceptance for more radical views by particular members of Latvian Muslim community.
- The European Islamists' active travelling to Syria poses long-term terrorism threats in the continent and this tendency can have a negative effect on the security of Latvia. The prolonged conflict in Syria poses a risk that it consequently could also resonate among Latvian Muslim believers with more radical views.
- The growing role of the Internet in the radicalisation of European Muslims increases the risk that the radical interpretation of Islam and religiously motivated violence can appeal to Muslims from those countries where the radical ideas are not that widespread and where radically-oriented groups of persons are not present.
- The deterioration of security situation in different terrorism risk regions, especially in Syria, will increase the possibility of immigration of terrorism-related persons to Latvia.

## 6. Pre-trial investigations

DP conducts pre-trial investigations for criminal offences, which are committed in the field of national security or in the national security and intelligence services and other offences within the scope of ones responsibilities, as well as in special cases when the investigation is to be conducted under the order of the Prosecutor General. DP is the only service out of three

Latvian security and intelligence services which has the rights to detain persons, initiate a criminal case and conduct pre-trial investigations in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law. In 2013, DP initiated 65 criminal cases, and one criminal case from another institution was handed over.

Dynamics of criminal cases initiated by DP




During the last year, 39 criminal (in 2012 there were 14 cases) cases were submitted to the Prosecutor's Office in order to initiate criminal cases against 56 persons, out of which 13 were officials. In comparison to 2012, in 2013 the number of persons against whom the criminal prosecution was initiated doubled, in addition the number of state and municipal officials has increased by four times.

Five criminal cases have been submitted to State Police in accordance with their responsibility, however in 26 cases

(in 2012 – 27 cases) a decision to terminate the criminal case was made. It should be noted that one of the aims for initiation of criminal procedure is to find out the truth, which also means to check whether a criminal offence has been committed using appropriate investigative methods defined by the law. Contrary to the wide spread assumption, the termination of a criminal case is not the sole indicator of the effectiveness of actions.

In the end of 2013, there were 98 criminal cases in the DP's record keeping.

### Initiated criminal cases in 2013



By conducting analysis of the criminal proceedings, we can resume that the major part consists of criminal offences related to causing national or ethnic hatred. Additionally, in 2013 all of the respective investigations, except for one, were related to


the activities performed on the Internet. In this respect, 12 were related to the statements addressed against Latvians, 7 – Jews and 2 – against Russians.

National and ethnic hatred is a kind of so-called *hate crimes*. Such criminal offences primarily threaten person's fundamental rights, particularly, the provision of the principle of equal attitude towards every and each one's belonging to some race, ethnic or national group. Hate crimes can also threaten person's rights to belong to some race, ethnic or national group to dignity, security and psychological safety in special cases

also the interests of person's health and life protection. Even though the hate crimes are contrary to fundamental principles of democracy, in major cases hate crimes do not pose direct threat to national security, which is why DP has initiated a discussion about the competence of the investigation of criminal offences.



## Dynamics of initiated criminal proceedings on national and racial hatred



In the society some DP decisions to dismiss or not initiate a criminal proceeding for the statements expressed by some persons has elicited a different reaction. In this respect, it should be stressed that these investigations are very complicated in terms of legal framework as it requires a balance between the freedom of speech and interests of national

security. Furthermore, the conclusion of an expert is of great significance during the course of investigation. Unfortunately, the current situation in Latvia indicates that there is a lack of such experts, which both prolongs the period of investigation and affects the result of the investigation.

## 7. Dignitary protection

In the field of dignitary protection, DP provides personal protection (guard) for the Speaker of the Saeima, Prime Minister and other officials, as well as representatives of foreign and international organisations and institutions designated by the Saeima Presidium or Cabinet of Ministers.

The security measures for dignitaries cover their physical immunity, secure transportation, the provision of the security of their working place, residence and locations in Latvian territory as well as prevention of unauthorised collection of information.

In 2013, DP officers ensured the security for dignitaries as well as their physical immunity also in 17 official foreign visits by providing necessary support to the officers of partner services involved in dignitary protection of the hosting country. Also 65 times a guaranteed security to foreign representatives during their

visits in Latvia were provided, as well as in 19 official events in our country dignitary protection was provided.

In the last year, no attempts to attack national or international representatives were registered. Also, the number of incidents related to the physical security in the residences or working places of the dignitaries decreased. However, the number of threats posed by phone, in written and in virtual world has increased.

The conclusion to be drawn says that the threat level of official dignitaries in 2013 remained relatively low. However, the experience of the European countries indicates that physical attacks on dignitaries in Latvia also could be committed. A special risk group is the persons who are not related to any kind of extremist group, but for different reasons plan and commit the attacks individually.



## 2014

Even though this report covers the activities carried out by DP and the current events regarding national security in 2013, moreover considering the developments in Ukraine, we cannot regard the issues of the last five months of 2014.

The developments in Ukraine have changed the understanding of the security not only in Latvia, but also all over the Europe. If in 2013 the aggression of some European country was regarded as history, in 2014 unfortunately it became reality. The reaction of some persons and organisations in Latvia regarding the developments confirms the assessment of risks in the field of national security in 2013, respectively, compatriot policy implemented by Russia in Latvia at present poses threats to state constitutional order, its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The non-critical support to the aggression in Ukraine by the Russian compatriot organisations and activists mentioned in the annual report of 2013, their attempts to use these developments in order to cause tension and segregation in Latvia, also demonstrates the rhetoric of compatriot organisations and of Russia is not a coincidence but a rule.

DP in close cooperation with two other national security and intelligence services and other authorities take different measures to prevent the risks which cover the prevention of provocations caused by the supporters of compatriot policy implemented by Russia, as well as briefing of state officials and responsible institutions on the identified risks in the field of national security in order to neutralise the threats. DP actively participates in the process of development of policy planning documents as well as regulations. Probably, a part of society might not understand the competence of a national security and intelligence service as they

expect some repressive activities, such as, detention, criminal proceedings etc. However, we would like to stress once again, that once the kinds of threats change, the role of national security and intelligence services in the prevention process also changes. The threats posed by the attempts of so-called *soft power* measures to affect the viewpoints of Latvian residents are not preventable only through legal instruments defined in criminal law, especially in a democratic country. A coordinated interference of other institutions for the neutralisation of the threats are necessary as well as systematic work on the development of legal framework in accordance with the new threat situation. The development of the system of national security with legal, political, economic, culture and education instruments by involving different state institutions, non-governmental organisations and society in general is the easiest way to prevent the challenges which we are facing at present.

It does not mean that the national security and intelligence services do not have to use repressive instruments which DP also uses when appropriate and according to law. In this respect, however, DP bases only on the laws and cannot arbitrary arrest or deport a person if it is not stipulated by the law. Withdrawal from democratic and legislative principles will not promote the security of Latvia, in contrary – it will diminish.

DP as a national security and intelligence service will continue putting its effort in the development of the national security system and use all legal instruments (also according to the criminal law) when applicable in order to prevent the attempts to manipulate with the society of Latvia and cause tension in our country with the aim to pursuit geopolitical interests of foreign countries in Latvia.

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