Public report
On the activities of Latvian Security Police in 2017
Dear reader,

Latvian Security Police (DP) is one of three Intelligence and Security services in Latvia¹ whose work is usually associated with high confidentiality, observing the necessity to protect information sources, operational methods and information provided by partners. However, it is not possible to ensure national security without public participation. DP has found in the last few years that active participation by the public has made a significant contribution to national security. Therefore, we are grateful to everyone who supports our work.

We have prepared and now hand over to you the annual report on DP's activities for 2017. The aim of this report is to inform the public about the results of the service's activities over the past year insofar as this is permitted by the necessary confidentiality of the intelligence and security services, as well as to provide a generally accessible evaluation of what we consider to be the most important processes and events of the past year which affected our national security.

A recurring theme over the last few years has been that the international security environment has been complex due to ongoing tensions in relations between NATO and European Union member states and Russia.

Looking back on the past year, it must be noted that Russia’s intelligence and security services continued their high levels of activity, conducting both traditional intelligence as well as informational operations against NATO and European Union member states, including Latvia. Russia’s hybrid threat has stimulated the service to intensify its counterintelligence work, applying this not only to protecting official secrets, but also educating government officials and the public to reduce the negative impact of Kremlin-coordinated activities on Latvia’s national security environment. Therefore, in the last year DP organised educational events for state and municipal officials and employees on counterintelligence risks and requirements for protecting official secrets. It is also noteworthy that at the end of last year, DP brought criminal charges as it arrested a Latvian citizen on suspicion of spying, the second such case since amendments to the Criminal Law were enacted in 2016.

Alongside threats posed by intelligence and security services, Latvia’s national security environment and particularly the integrity of our constitutional order continued to be negatively affected by Kremlin-coordinated humanitarian influence measures. Despite a reduction in funding for humanitarian influence instruments such as

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¹ The three Intelligence and Security Services in Latvia are DP, Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) and Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
the so-called *companion policy*, last year subjects connected to these instruments continued their activities aimed against NATO and EU member states. Hiding behind freedom of speech and assembly and other attributes of a democratic society, Russia continued to distribute messages furthering its political interests via the Russia-funded companion policy and other activists.

In addition to the usual informational influence activities, the last year the Kremlin’s priority areas of action included humanitarian influence measures aimed at preserving, disseminating and maintaining Russia’s historical memory, paying particular attention to cataloguing and restoring military memorials. These activities were clearly observable in all three Baltic States.

In terms of protecting the constitutional order, DP devoted significant resources to ensuring observance of the principles enshrined in the Constitution and other legal acts in the conduct of campaigning and on polling day of city and district (municipal) council elections. Although no direct attempts to influence the elections by a foreign country were observed, unfortunately in these elections DP also brought criminal charges against several persons for deliberately hindering another person’s right to freely elect deputies.

In parallel to the threats posed by Russia, a high terrorism threat level remained in force in Europe which also negatively affected Latvia’s national security environment. As in previous years, 2017 also saw several large-scale terrorist attacks in Europe, which cost the lives of many innocent people and for which responsibility was claimed by the terrorism-related criminal organisation (hereinafter – terrorist group) Daesh.

Unlike many other European countries, the terrorism threat level in Latvia remained low last year. However, the results of propaganda and radicalisation efforts by terrorist groups were also observed in our country. Even as Daesh continued losing ground in Syria and Iraq, it continued to call on its followers to commit terrorist acts in their countries of residence. DP is monitoring several residents of Latvia who have gone to Syria and joined Daesh. The so-called returnees are one of the main sources of terrorist threats in Europe. Therefore, the amendments made by the Saeima to the National Security Law last year are commendable as, amongst other things, they expand the service’s options for restricting travel by Latvian inhabitants to prevent them from joining terrorist groups or otherwise getting involved in terrorism-related activities.

Analysis of the events of the last year in the international and regional security environment indicate that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy will continue this year, including activities by its intelligence and security services, and the threat posed to our national security by terrorist propaganda will also persist. In 2018, the Kremlin’s use of hybrid methods to further its political interests and strengthen its position internationally will continue to be one of the main threats to Latvia. In this regard, particular attention must be paid to Latvia’s centenary celebrations and the Saeima elections scheduled for autumn. Russia has been trying to influence public opinion in Latvia for a long time, using its influence in Latvia’s informational space, particularly amongst the audience which consumes information in the Russian language. The possibility cannot be discounted that the intensity of the information campaign will increase in the run-up to the elections, changing accents and adapting to the situation. We have grounds for suspecting that messages aligned with Russia’s foreign policy interests will be included. Therefore, the priorities of our service for this year will continue to be preventing threats posed by activities of Russia’s intelligence and security services and preventing hybrid threats emanating from Russia, ensuring that free and democratic elections are held, and restricting the impact of terrorist propaganda and radicalisation.

This year, Latvia will celebrate the centenary of its declaration of independence. Latvia will enter its second century as an integral part of the world’s most powerful military alliance and one of the world’s largest economies. This gives us confidence to look optimistically to the future in the expectation that the formation of the state which began one hundred years ago will never again be interrupted. However, no matter how strong are our allies, the future of our country is primarily the responsibility of each inhabitant of Latvia. Therefore, I call on every inhabitant of Latvia to help our country to develop and grow and to support its security.

Yours sincerely

N.Mežviets
Director General of DP
1. Counterintelligence

One of the core functions of DP in the national security field is identifying activities by foreign intelligence and security services against the security of the state of Latvia in a timely manner, as well as protecting information of importance to national security, including information containing official secrets, in line with the competence stipulated in the law “On Official Secrets”.

DP regularly informs Latvia’s top officials and responsible institutions about the results of counterintelligence activities and uncovered threats. DP also organises informational, educational events to increase awareness of counterintelligence and related risks and threats to national security. In the reporting period, DP held 116 such events for an audience of almost 5,500 representatives from 53 state and municipal institutions. In 2017, DP also prepared and published an informative booklet about counterintelligence risks for state and municipal bodies, describing the threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services and action in the event of hostile recruitment.

1.1. Activities by foreign intelligence and security services in Latvia

As in previous periods, last year the greatest counterintelligence threats and challenges came from Russia’s intelligence and security services\(^2\) – no other state’s intelligence and security services come close in terms of ambition or aggression. Russia is interested in Latvia not only due to it being a neighbouring state, but also because it is part of the territory and forms part of the eastern border of NATO and the EU, under whose Enhanced Forward Presence policy forces of the partner states of the North Atlantic Alliance are stationed here. The attention paid to Latvia by Russia’s intelligence and security services was driven by the key objective of Russia’s foreign policy – restoring Russia’s international influence. In support of this doctrine, Russia’s intelligence and security services not only attempted to obtain confidential information in Latvia, they also played a role in humanitarian and informational influence measures.

In addition to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Latvia’s defence policy, national security issues, social, political and economic processes, the interests of Russia’s intelligence and security services also covered the “Zapad-2017” military exercises held from 14 to 20 September 2017. Although in the spheres in which DP ensures the counterintelligence regime aggressive attempts by Russia’s intelligence and security services to obtain classified information were not identified during the active phase of these exercises, they were nevertheless interested in the reaction of Latvian state officials and the general public to the exercises, manifested as intensified analysis of open information sources as

\(^2\) The Federal Security Service (FSB), in Russian language Федеральная Служба Безопасности, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), in Russian language Служба Внешней Разведки, and the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff (GRU), in Russian language Главное управление Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации.
well as the inclusion of this question in interviews conducted with residents of Latvia crossing the border with Russia.

By entering and spending time in Russian territory, Latvian residents were subject to significant counterintelligence risks. These include the risk of recruitment, with the greatest danger posed to Latvian residents involved in illegal activities, primarily smuggling and corruption. Also, the state and municipal officials and employees as well as persons who have direct or indirect access to significant state databases and information systems or other sensitive information, including personal data, are subject to the indicated counterintelligence risks. It should be noted that Russia’s intelligence and security services may be interested in secretly collaborating with any resident of Latvia, irrespective of whether or not this person has access to official secrets, if they see immediate or long-term possibilities of using them to further their interests. On its own territory, Russia’s intelligence and security services do not have to worry about counterintelligence measures, therefore they can use a broad range of instruments to force Latvian residents into secret collaboration. In this context, the most intense intelligence activities carried out against Latvia from the territory of Russia are implemented by the FSB.

**FSB AGAINST LATVIA**

The **FSB Counterintelligence Service** is responsible for counterintelligence measures against foreigners. The primary targets of this service are Latvian residents spending extended periods in Russian territory. Such persons include Latvian diplomats, journalists, students and business people who permanently reside in Russia due to professional or personal reasons.

The **FSB Border Guard Service** is responsible for protecting Russia’s external border and conducting counterintelligence measures in the borderland. For Latvian residents, the staff of this service are often the first point of contact with the FSB.

Russia’s intelligence and security services exploit this situation to obtain pre-emptive information about borderland area residents who frequently travel to the RF on the basis of eased border crossing requirements. This information is later used by other FSB units to make operational contacts with such persons within Russian territory.

The **FSB Operational Information and International Contacts Service** is responsible for recruitment of agents within Russian territory. Its officials are interested in establishing contacts with Latvian residents who travel to Russia periodically.

Service officials take particular interest in persons involved in illegal activities, for example smuggling and corruption. Also, the state and municipal officials and employees are attracting its interest. Attention is also paid to attendees at gatherings of military veterans, participants in various conferences, seminars and camps, persons involved in cross-border cooperation projects, as well as borderland area residents who often travel to Russia.

In the last year, FSB continued to actively use border crossing procedures for their own interests: checking of documents, interviews during border crossing, control of customs and migration procedures. Under cover of these procedures, information is obtained about what is happening in Latvia and public reactions to processes important to Russia, as well as gathering personal information about persons who could potentially be involved in secret collaboration. To create situations where Latvian residents would agree to cooperate, the FSB cooperates with other Russian state bodies, including the Federal Customs Service and the Ministry of Interior Main Board of Migration Affairs. These bodies were involved to incriminate Latvian residents in administrative or criminal offences under the guise of supposed problems with travel documents or infringements of border crossing procedures, thus applying psychological pressure and encouraging collaboration.
Counterintelligence risks in Latvia’s eastern borderland area were also posed by FSB support for smugglers within the green border area. Information obtained by DP confirms reports from the other Baltic States’ intelligence and security services\(^3\) that the FSB exercises control over smuggling groups active in the borderland area. These groups are used to obtain information about staff members and equipment held by the Latvian State Border Guard, border crossing procedures, competing smuggler groups, as well as security infrastructure in Latvia’s Vidzeme and Latgale regions.

Demand for smuggled excise goods and deficiencies in the border control system continue to create favourable conditions for the involvement of Latvian residents in excise goods smuggling. Members of such Latvian organised crime groups often have contacts with FSB-controlled smuggling groups in Pskov Region. In this way, Latvian smugglers came to the notice of the FSB as possible recruits for gaining information about the situation in the Russian-Latvian borderland area.

Russia’s intelligence and security services also continued intelligence activities using internationally active Russian organised crime groups. In recent years, representatives of several such groups have moved permanently to EU countries, including Latvia. To reduce the counterintelligence risks posed by such persons, last year DP urged the Minister for Interior to annul the residence permits of two representatives of Russian organised crime, as well as recommended that these persons be placed on the list of foreign citizens barred from entering and residing in Latvia.

Russia’s intelligence and security services were also involved with pro-Kremlin activists implementing the Kremlin’s humanitarian influence measures in Latvia, such as compatriot policy, the promotion of interpretations of history favourable to Russia and propaganda campaigns.

One of the priorities of humanitarian measures in 2017 continued to be the nurturing of a new generation of pro-Kremlin activists. For this reason, young people studying at Russian universities or travelling to Russia to attend youth camps, conferences and seminars were subject to counterintelligence risks. Last year, one of the largest such events in terms of the number of participants ever held in Russia – the XIX World Youth and Student Festival – also attracted a Latvian delegation. Since the sustainability of Russian influence measures against Latvia depends directly on raising a new generation of pro-Kremlin activists, Latvian residents aged 18-30 attending such events were at risk of drawing the attention of Russia’s intelligence and security services.

In implementing counterintelligence measures, DP continued to identify “systemic vulnerabilities”, i.e. conditions which could make it easier for Russia’s intelligence and security services to make contacts with Latvian residents. For example, last year it was observed that representatives from certain sectors became involved in cross-border projects with Russia without sufficiently evaluating the often-scant benefits compared with the high level of counterintelligence risk. These projects involve a number of high-risk groups, such as academic and scientific professionals, law enforcement officers and municipal officials. Not infrequently, the representatives of these groups shared a common trait, namely their inability to find cooperation partners in Western countries owing to a lack of professionalism (deficiencies in their offerings or reputations) or personal reasons (poor knowledge of foreign languages). For these groups, cooperation with the countries to the east remained a pathway to enhancing their reputations or sharing knowledge, and Russia’s intelligence and security services can use this to their advantage.

\(^3\) In 2017, Estonia’s Internal Security Service (KAPO) reported on FSB activities against criminal groups in the borderland area. Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) and Finland’s Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) have also reported publicly on Russia’s interest in smugglers.
1.2. Protection of official secrets

Pursuant to the law “On Official Secrets”, official secrets are military, political, economic, scientific, technical or other information which is included in a list approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and whose loss or illegal disclosure could cause harm to state security, economic or political interests.

In accordance with the competence of institutions stipulated in the law “On Official Secrets”, DP, Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) and Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) lead, coordinate, control and conduct measures for the protection of official secrets. In the sphere of protecting official secrets, DP conducts checks on persons before they are issued with security clearances for access to official secrets (hereinafter security clearances), checks the compliance of the personnel and premises of existing institutions under its competence with confidentiality and official secret protection requirements as well as performs special checks of commercial entities for issuing specific categories of industrial security certificates so that they can be eligible for tenders concerning official secrets’ objects.

Last December, DP filed criminal charges against a Republic of Latvia citizen for breaching Article 85 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Law – spying. The arrested person was held on suspicion of long-term, systematic obtaining of information about Latvia’s defence sector and giving this to Russia’s intelligence and security services. In the last two years, DP has initiated criminal proceedings against two Latvian residents for spying on behalf of a foreign intelligence and security service. Both of these cases confirm the assumption that Russia’s intelligence and security services mainly do their recruiting and run their agencies within Russian territory. In the immediate future, this circumstance will continue to provide significant challenges for national security, because despite the increasing opportunities for espionage provided by technological developments, Russia’s intelligence and security services are continuing to actively recruit Latvian residents, which provides means of verifying and clarifying information initially obtained by technical means.

DYNAMIC OF SECURITY CLEARANCES
ISSUED BY DP

Number of issued category three clearances for working with official secrets’ objects
Number of issued category two clearances for working with official secrets’ objects
In 2017, DP issued a total of 2 178 security clearances, of which 1 375 were category two security clearances (up to confidentiality level SECRET), and 803 were category three security clearances (up to confidentiality level CONFIDENTIAL).

In 2017, DP made 23 decisions to reject issuing security clearances. Most refusals to issue security clearances applied to state officials and security company employees working at critical infrastructure objects:

- Twelve refusals were made based on the persons failing to comply with Section 9 Article 3 Paragraph 6 of the law “On Official Secrets”, pursuant to which access to confidential, secret and top-secret official secrets’ objects is denied to persons for whom, in accordance with checks, there are grounds for doubting their loyalty and ability to keep official secrets. For example, during checks they deliberately provided false information or deliberately hid or fabricated facts or failed to observe rules for protecting information containing official secrets;

- Nine refusals were made based on the persons failing to comply with Section 9 Article 3 Paragraph 3 of the law “On Official Secrets”, pursuant to which access to confidential, secret and top-secret official secrets’ objects is denied to persons tried and found guilty of deliberate criminal acts;

- One refusal was made based on the person failing to comply with Section 9 Article 3 Paragraph 4 of the law “On Official Secrets”, pursuant to which security clearances may not be issued to former members of the Soviet intelligence and security services;

- One refusal was made based on the person failing to comply with Section 9 Article 2 of the law “On Official Secrets”, pursuant to which security clearances may only be issued to citizens of Latvia.

As DP only issues category two and three security clearances, materials on 43 persons were sent to SAB to evaluate their compliance with receiving category one security clearances (up to confidentiality level TOP SECRET). In addition, DP sent materials on 13 commercial entities to SAB to receive or extend industrial security certificates.
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

- During the reporting period, the most significant threats to Latvia’s national security continued to be posed by Russia’s intelligence and security services. The FSB, which in terms of scope was the most active Russia’s intelligence and security service, mainly conducted intelligence activities against Latvia and Latvian residents from within Russia, exploiting the large number of persons travelling for personal or professional reasons to Russia or permanently residing there.

- Due to Latvia’s strategic role within the security architecture of NATO, as well as the ever-increasing role of the intelligence and security services in furthering Russia’s foreign policy agenda, DP forecasts that activities by Russia’s intelligence and security services will continue to pose significant risks to Latvia’s national security.

- The close relationship between Russia’s intelligence and security services and Russia’s humanitarian influence instruments abroad, including compatriot policy activists, persons involved in military-memorial work and pro-Kremlin mass media, must be considered a potential risk also in the future.

- It is anticipated that in the near future, Russia’s intelligence and security services will make greater use of non-traditional methods and influence channels against NATO countries, the aim of which is not merely to obtain information but also to create the conditions for implementing Russia’s foreign policy interests.

- It is also anticipated that Russia’s intelligence and security services will be active in connection with the Saeima elections in 2018 and Latvia’s centenary celebrations in order to discredit these processes and possibly influence them in accordance with Russia’s foreign policy interests.

- The long-term presence in the Baltic countries of a contingent from NATO partner countries has made this region a priority for Russian military intelligence, whose all-encompassing approach to obtaining intelligence may also affect sectors providing support functions for the defence sector, such as law enforcement bodies, providers of public services and logistics, as well as construction firms.
Protection of the foundations of Latvia’s statehood – sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and democratic government – is one of the core tasks of DP. Without waiting for concrete actions aimed against the foundations of the state, DP continued concentrating its resources in the timely identification of threats, as well as analysing the impact of processes and events on national security in order to identify and prevent significant risk factors.

Because ensuring national security is a function not just of state institutions but of society as a whole, last year the service paid greater attention to explaining the impact of events and processes on national security as a whole, as well as on the protection of the constitutional order directly. At the same time, while continuing to perform the tasks stipulated in the Law “On State Intelligence and Security Services”, DP continued drafting recommendations for policy planning and legislative documents in a number of areas connected with protecting Latvia’s constitutional order.

It is notable that while threats posed by left- and right-wing radicals and extremists remains low, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy course continued to directly threaten our constitutional order.

2. Protection of the constitutional order

2.1. Russia’s compatriot policy

2.1.1. Description of compatriot policy

Officially established as a diaspora support policy, Russia’s compatriot policy\(^4\) is part of Russia’s foreign policy of supporting Russian citizens and so-called compatriot communities\(^5\) in foreign countries. DP considers that its concrete operating mechanism reveals a systematic use of this policy to increase Russia’s influence in neighbouring countries, deploying humanitarian measures as cover, which in the long-term supports Russia’s interference in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries. A typical example involves the use of compatriot communities to achieve Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the countries of residence of these communities, for example using community members to disseminate messages favourable to Russia’s foreign policy and desired interpretation of history. Moreover, the past year saw increasing evidence that compatriot policy is being subordinated to other Russia’s political goals in neighbouring countries.

Every year, the Russian State Duma Committee for the CIS affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots holds parliamentary hearings regarding Russia’s compatriot policy in relation to Russian diasporas. Russia’s compatriot policy activists and Russian community leaders abroad are invited to speak at this

\(^4\) In this report, the term “Russian compatriots” applies to persons and associations of persons (organisations) that take part in their countries of residence in measures implemented by Russia to achieve its compatriot policy objectives, disseminating messages favourable to Russia’s policy and interests, or otherwise supporting Russia’s interests in their countries of residence.

\(^5\) In Russia, the term “compatriots” is defined not only as the body of citizens of Russia abroad, but also includes persons identifying with the so-called “Russian world”, for example ethnic Russians, citizens of other countries who speak Russian language, and individuals and communities socialised in Russia’s cultural space regardless of their ethnic group.
event. The annual hearing was held on 20 March 2017, which was attended by Viktors Guščins, the formal leader of Russian compatriots in Latvia and coordinator of the unregistered Russian youth “umbrella” body the “Latvian Council of Civic Organisations” (hereinafter – LSOP). DP considers that in his address, V.Guščins made false and defamatory accusations against Latvia, for example that “Nazism is reviving” in Latvia and that Latvian laws massively discriminate against “Russian speakers”. The voicing of such messages does not contribute to social cohesion in Latvia, and their expression at events organised by Russia’s institutions formally legitimises Russia’s attempts to influence processes in Latvia.

Institutions at all levels of the state in Russia are involved in implementing compatriot policy, including the Presidential Administration, the State Duma, the government and its subordinated ministries, agencies and compatriots’ support foundations subordinated to ministries, as well as city and regional administration bodies. The central role in funding Russia’s compatriot policy projects is still played by the Federal Agency for the CIS issues, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation “Rossotrudnichestvo”, which also grants money to Russian compatriot organisations working in Latvia for organising humanitarian events. DP considers that only organisations which have demonstrated longstanding loyalty to Russian Embassy in Latvia, and which disseminate pro-Kremlin views amongst their supporters on a regular basis, have the right to apply for such funding.

Russian compatriots’ support foundations are official Russian institutions with whose assistance Russia funds and implements its compatriot policy abroad. Not infrequently these foundations also have representative offices abroad which can be conveniently used by Russia’s intelligence and security services, both by giving specific instructions for the attainment of humanitarian influence, and by giving cover to current and former members of the intelligence and security services.

The Russian federal agency “Rossotrudnichestvo” is a body subordinated to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs which works to establish a variety of international contacts, promote Russian culture, perform public diplomacy, support compatriots, preserve military memorials, organise cooperation in education and science, etc.

“The Foundation for the Support and Protection of Rights of Russian Compatriots living Abroad” is an organisation answering to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and “Rossotrudnichestvo”. The foundation provides legal and financial support for the protection of compatriots’ rights abroad. Not infrequently, this foundation pays the legal costs in various scandalous “human rights” cases, which are later used in Russian information campaigns to defame other countries. The foundation also funds other activities which produce “proof” that the rights of compatriots are being abused, such as publishing pseudo-scientific books.

The Foundation “Russkij Mir” is an organisation subordinated to Russia’s Ministry of Education and Science and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is tasked with disseminating and reinforcing the ideology of the so-called “Russian world”. The core of the foundation’s work is encouraging the spreading of Russian language and culture. The foundation gives grants to compatriots’ organisations, as well organises its own Russian language courses and funds “Russian centres” and “Russian world” offices at educational institutions abroad, including in Latvia.

“The A.M.Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund” operates under the wing of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foundation mainly works to develop international contacts in diplomatic, academic and other professional circles. It typically organises conferences, summer schools, forums and similar events. Through the foundation’s events, Russia seeks to disseminate its vision of the world and foreign policy, thereby attracting likeminded persons and recruiting potential influence agents in foreign countries.
Although Russia’s compatriot policy remained one of the most important tools of Russia’s humanitarian influence, in the last year its implementation was severely affected by NATO and EU sanctions against Russia. Russia’s recession of the last few years has affected the budgets of institutions implementing compatriot policy, which continued to be cut in 2017. As a result, Russian compatriots were forced to seek alternative funding sources, as the funding institutions demanded stricter application procedures and reports to ensure that money was being spent on its earmarked purpose. Those organisations whose representatives had good relationships with officials from Russian compatriot funds had the most success in attracting funding.

In the bygone year, Russia’s compatriot policy focussed on “protection of rights” and issues related to preserving historical memory, with promotion of classic humanitarian influence, such as supporting Russian language and culture and education, relegated to secondary status. Most classic humanitarian influence events, such as conferences, forums, seminars, camps and festivals, were held in Russia. Participation in the events was restricted to successful Russian compatriot activists approved by the Russian Embassy in Latvia. It is notable that in addition to Russia’s central institutions, such events were also hosted by the municipal administration of Moscow and St. Petersburg as well as the district administrations of Pskov, Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions near Latvia.

Despite funding cutbacks and problems with efficiency, compatriot policy retains an important place in Russia’s foreign policy. It has the advantage of using democratic mechanisms as a cloak for systematically influencing the domestic policies and decisions of foreign countries to suit the Kremlin’s political agenda, which is at the same time not in the target state’s interests. Therefore, activities carried out under the cover of Russia’s compatriot policy continued to pose risks to Latvia’s constitutional order. For a long time, this has been a key part of Russia’s attempts to interfere in our domestic affairs, using mechanisms to influence civil society such as funding initiatives and activities which cause divisions in society, as well as presenting marginal organisations as official representatives of the local Russian community.

2.1.2. Manifestations of compatriot policy in Latvia

In Latvia, Russian compatriot activists are usually persons who identify themselves with Russia’s socio-political space mainly on the basis of so-called “Soviet nostalgia”. For some activists, another important factor was gaining funding for their routine activities. In DP’s view, the number of Russian compatriot activists compared with the total Russian community in Latvia remains small. Moreover, the activists have a greater need for approval from the Russian Embassy rather than the public, in order to attract regular support for their activities.

The aforementioned aligns with the growing role in coordinating compatriot policy in Latvia played by the Russian Embassy and its Consulates General in Daugavpils and Liepāja. In the last year, representatives from the Russian diplomatic missions actively forged relationships with in their view promising Russian compatriot organisations and individual activists. As a result of this symbiotic relationship, Russian compatriot activists gained funding from the Russian Embassy for a number of activities. Russia has an interest in strengthening ties with the compatriot community in Latvia to consolidate it and reinforce its sense of belonging to the so-called “Russian world”, which DP has also written about in previous reports, thereby gaining control of a loyal group with which it can influence Latvia’s domestic affairs in a manner desirable to Russia. In situations where the activities of particular activists bordered on incitement of ethnic hatred or intolerance, DP held discussions with them to warn about the potentially illegal nature of such activities.
Formally, the consolidation of Russian compatriots in Latvia continued to be performed by the unregistered LSOP. DP considers that its coordinator V. Guščins is a person closely connected to the Russian Embassy, which maintains the LSOP as the central platform for active compatriots in Latvia to exchange views. But in reality, the Russian compatriot environment in Latvia is fragmented, with individuals and organisations competing for limited available funding and holding sharply divergent opinions, which in some cases prompts the intervention of the Russian Embassy to maintain a public façade of the apparent solidarity of Russian compatriots. Also of significance for the work of LSOP and V. Guščins was Riga’s “Moscow House”, which opened its doors to various events organised by LSOP and its constituent organisations. Moreover, for a long time V. Guščins has used the “Moscow House” premises as his personal office, where he meets with other Russian compatriots to organise various activities.

A range of other Russian compatriot organisations and individual activists also remained relatively active in 2017:

- Some regional organisations which actively cooperated with the LSOP and tried to involve their representatives in various compatriot events in Russia;
- A number of humanitarian-oriented organisations, for example the “Culture Development Fund”, which handed out Saint George Ribbons at the 9 May “Victory Day” event in Riga, despite the event organisers’ stance against the centralised distribution of the ribbons, which are controversial and divisive;
- A few so-called “protection of rights” organisations such as the Human Rights Committee of Latvia, which receives regular funding from the Russian compatriots’ support foundations;
- Individual activists such as Aleksandrs Gapoņenko, Vladimirs Lindermans, the so-called “anti-fascists”, etc. For example, the “anti-fascists” traditionally focus on trying to create resonance in Russian mass media concerning Latvian Legionnaires Remembrance Day procession on 16 March, trying to organise provocative demonstrations.

In DP’s view, over the last year, A. Gapoņenko has harmonised his activities with the necessity of obtaining funding from organisations in Russia. His efforts were chaotic and highly subjective, expressing views to Russian mass media and issuing his own publications based on false or questionable “facts”, with the result that other Russian compatriots in Latvia distanced themselves from him. A. Gapoņenko also tried to disrupt the work of the association “The Russian Community of Latvia” (hereinafter – LKK). DP considers that A. Gapoņenko cast doubts on the president of the LKK and stoked the hostility of LKK members in order to get a new leader for the organisation elected who would be loyal and useful to him. Ultimately, A. Gapoņenko’s provocative style backfired, and his chosen candidate failed to get elected.

In anticipation of the 2017 municipal elections and the 2018 Saeima elections, the political party “Latvian Russian Union” (hereinafter – LKS) increased its public activities. In early 2017, DP found that LKS could serve as a platform for implementing Russia’s interests in Latvia through a registered political organisation. The party’s key policy is the retention of Russian as a language of teaching in Latvia’s secondary schools to the same extent as has been the case to date. To further this objective, long-time party activists including Miroslavs Mitrofanovs, Vladimirs Buzajevs and Juris Petropavlovskis have resumed their activities.

Overall, the trends of the last year show that Russia’s institutions expected greater self-organisation from compatriots in Latvia, whereas for many years the Russian compatriot environment has been fragmented and marred by competition over scarce resources. Although a range of Russian compatriots’ organisations hoped that the situation would improve after the appointment of Evgeny Lukyanov as Ambassador in February, only a handful of compatriot organisations and individuals who have proven themselves to be loyal to the Russian Embassy and Russia’s foreign policy course received any support.

In previous reports, DP has already drawn attention to deficiencies in the legal framework of Latvian associations and foundations which could be used as tools for simulating civil society activity, thereby supporting Russia’s compatriot policy in Latvia. In 2016, DP became involved in drafting amendments to the Associations and Foundations Law to improve legal regulation relating to procedures for the termination of an association, if it is a threat to national security. The Saeima adopted these amendments at the end of 2017. The amendments stipulate that in its public activities an association may not oppose Latvia’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, express or disseminate proposals for the violent overthrow of the Latvian state, call for breaking laws, inciting violence, ethnic or racial hatred, propagate Nazi, fascist or communist ideologies, disseminate war propaganda, or to praise or call for the committing of criminal acts and other infringements of the law. The amendments also provide legal instruments for stricter control of funding. However, the amendments are not applicable to monitoring unregistered structures, which in Latvia fall outside the framework of regulation.
Typical activities by Russian compatriots in 2017 – reinforcement of Russian historical memory, “defending compatriots’ rights” and involvement in Russia’s information campaigns. Screenshots from Russian TV channels Царьград ТВ (from top left) and НТВ-Мир (from bottom right). Youtube.
In the last year, Russian compatriot activists had three main areas of focus:

- “Defending the rights” of Russian compatriots;
- Disseminating historical interpretations favoured by Russia and preserving and maintaining Russian historical memory in Latvian society;
- Spreading messages supporting Russia’s foreign policy containing defamatory narratives and disinformation about Latvia.

Most Russian compatriot activists engaged in all of these spheres, as they often complement one another. However, increasing attention was paid to activities for the preservation of Russian historical memory, as a means of physically and emotionally strengthening ties with Russia for both older and younger generations of Russians in Latvia, the latter having not lived in the USSR.

The most significant development in the past year in the sphere of “defending the rights” of Russian compatriots were the protests and related activities such as petitions against the gradual transition to Latvian as the language of teaching in general educational institutions, demanding that the changes be halted or that the model of organising minority education be reformed. DP considers that by pressing the absurd accusation that Latvia is planning the forced assimilation of Russian-speakers, LKS leader Tatjana Ždanoka along with her party’s members and other allies are trying to polarise and split society in Latvia.

In the context of the upcoming 2018 Saeima elections, LKS most likely chose this as a campaign issue. LKS representatives also sought support in Russia, not only by trying to feature in news reports and political shows, but also by making contacts with Russian politicians and officials. Using her status as a Member of the European Parliament, T.Ždanoka invited Alexandra Dokuchayeva, a staff member at the Russian Integration and Diaspora Institute and an assistant to Russian State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin, to a meeting with LKS members and other activists. At the meeting, A. Dokuchayeva promised the LKS members that Russia would give political and administrative support to “counter actions” against the gradual transition to Latvian as the language of teaching in general educational institutions.

In the sphere of disseminating interpretations of history favourable to Russia, the most visible public activities centred around the so-called “Victory Day” celebrations on 9 May. For the third 9 May in a row, compatriot activist Margarita Dragiļe together with A.Gapoņenko and Elizabete Krivečova organised one of the central events for preserving Russian historical memory in Riga, the “Immortal Regiment”, which has become a widely-deployed Russian humanitarian influence tool outside of Russia itself. As in previous years, a conflict arose with the ranks of the compatriot activists over the right to organise the “Immortal Regiment” between M.Dragiļe and the so-called “anti-fascists”. Diplomats from the Russian Embassy tried to arbitrate these disputes between activists. M.Dragiļe most likely got to host the “Immortal Regiment” thanks to support from the embassy as well as Riga City Council representatives. DP believes that this conflict which has now occurred two years in a row around the memorial event clearly shows that the respective activists want to raise their profiles for the benefit of the Embassy of Russia rather than the local Russian community.

In the last year, DP also uncovered efforts by the Russian Embassy to cooperate with certain historians who have published works aligning with Russia’s interpretation of history, as well as military archaeologists. These persons became actively involved in researching and preserving graves, military memorials and cultural heritage sites in Latvia related to the Czarist and Soviet periods. DP believes that the main role in the non-governmental sector for this work has been assigned to the association “Memorial of our Memory”, and several military archaeology clubs. Military memorial restoration and preservation activities carry within them long-term risks of polarising society, as they are accompanied by ideological activities which praise the might of the Soviet Union which occupied Latvia. Soviet military monuments are also gathering places for local youths, thus helping part of society in Latvia to uphold Russia’s official interpretation of history.
The association “Memorial of our Memory” was founded on 16 November 2016. Although its stated aim is “to preserve historical memory of the dramatic events of the 20th century in Latvia”, in reality it is actively involved in researching and preserving graves, military memorials and heritage sites in Latvia related to the Czarist and Soviet periods. The association is headed by Aleksandrs Vasiljevs, who was previously involved in founding the unregistered organisation the “Congress of Non-Citizens”. Currently, A.Vasiljevs is the director of the “Baltic Forum” (an annual event examining problem issues of relations between the West and Russia.) Several veteran Russian compatriot activists are also members of the association. In 2017, “Memorial of our Memory” organised two conferences about Soviet military graves, as well as published a map of Latvia indicating Second World War Soviet military graves and memorials. Thanks to these activities, last year the association established contacts with representatives from the Russian Embassy, who increasingly made use of the association in Russian humanitarian influence events.

In parallel to practical Russian humanitarian influence activities, Russian compatriots willingly took part in Russia’s information campaigns against Latvia. Usually, Russian compatriot activists living in Latvia were positioned in the Kremlin-controlled media as “defenders of rights” or “experts” in a particular field. These reports featured opinions by compatriot activists which were targeting Latvia and exaggerated in subjects such as the supposed massive discrimination against Latvia’s minorities, the “rebirth of Nazism” in Latvia, various issues relating to interpretations of history, Latvia as an “ethnocracy” etc. Questions were also raised about Latvia’s political priorities, criticising the deployment of NATO forces in Latvia and Latvia’s social and economic problems, claiming that the funding for resolving these latter issues had been spent instead on defence. In some of these reports, compatriot activists disseminated blatant disinformation, seeking to discredit the enhanced NATO presence in Latvia. In DP’s view, A.Gapoņenko was the most frequent disseminator of disinformation, while Vladimirs Lindermans periodically provided biased comments for Russian propaganda media. Not infrequently, Russian compatriots from Latvia were also invited to recording of propaganda shows in Moscow, with all their travel and accommodation costs covered.

With the changing of generations and as people who were neither born nor lived in the USSR took more prominent public roles, fewer and fewer young people joined the ranks of the compatriot activists. This trend has been identified both by Russian compatriots in Latvia and institutions in Russia implementing compatriot policy, therefore efforts were made in 2017 to involve young people in compatriot activities abroad. The World Russian Compatriot Youth Forum supported by the “Russkij Mir” foundation was held for the third time in Bulgaria’s capital Sofia from 22 to 26 September, while from 14 to 22 October the XIX World Youth and Student Festival was held in Sochi, Russia, attracting participants also from Latvia.

The XIX World Youth and Student Festival was organised by the left-wing organisation the “World Federation of Democratic Youth”, bringing together a number of communist-oriented organisations in close collaboration with Russian state institutions. During the Cold War, such festivals were traditionally aimed at bringing together loyal young people from the USSR and the socialist block for joint activities. High-rank officials such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the festival. Although the festival is conceptually based on globalism and communist ideology, it has been adapted to serve the foreign policy requirements of modern Russia, providing a platform for various organisations and Russian state institutions to criticise Western integration and globalisation. The festival attracted 25,000 participants from 188 countries, including about 90 persons from Latvia.

Participation by young people in Russian compatriot events facilitates their socialisation in the ideology of the so-called “Russian world”. In the long term, this will strengthen Russia’s influence in Latvia by new generation of compatriot activists and Russian influence agents. This process is also encouraged by Russia’s systematic efforts to attract foreign students. “Rossotrudnichestvo” coordinates the enrolment of Latvian high school students in Russian universities for places funded by the Russian state budget. Through the mediation of “Rossotrudnichestvo” and the Russian Embassy, every year Russia offers more and more subsidised places in its universities. Last autumn, a quota of 150 students from Latvia was set. Russian compatriot activists were also involved in student selection, clearly hoping in the long-term to recruit fresh influence agents.
2.2. Activities of right- and left-wing radicals and extremists, paramilitary movements and organisations

In the last year, DP continued to monitor certain radicalised individuals and organisations, who pose a relatively low threat level to our national security. It is notable that since the restoration of Latvia’s independence, due to a variety of factors, radical and extremist movements\(^6\) have been unable to take root and flourish in Latvian society, and this trend continues. There are practically no left-wing radical and extremist organisations in Latvia, while right-wing ones are small and passive. Moreover, they are mostly internally fragmented.

Individual right-wing activists preferred to express their views electronically, usually on the internet. Such persons also occasionally organised events which attracted little public attention, or they joined events organised by other individuals or organisations in order to popularise their ideology, as well as to protest against immigration, the national social-political situation and other issues. In a few isolated cases, extreme right-wing individuals (for example skinheads) planned loutish activities, thereby causing risks to public order and safety.

Much greater challenges were posed by hobby groups learning self-defence, martial arts and weapons skills. In the last year, DP particularly focussed on such groups which also have ideological motivations. Some such organisations continued organising paramilitary-style activities for their members and other interested persons, while also engaging in public activities to try and attract followers. DP considers that the danger posed by such groups comes from a combination of various extremist ideologies and teaching specific skills, resulting in the possible radicalisation of the organisation’s members.

So-called military simulation games such as airsoft also continue to pose risks to national security. DP discovered earlier that certain groups use this hobby as a cover for training exercises to develop tactical military skills. In the last year, DP continued monitoring the airsoft environment to prevent ideologically-motivated military simulation group activities. DP also identified attempts by a few airsoft enthusiasts to forge links with similar clubs in Russia to jointly play military simulation games. Considering these risks, DP recommended to the Minister for Interior that certain airsoft devotees from Russia be placed on the list of persons temporarily barred from entering Latvia. Nevertheless, DP has a positive regard for most members of the airsoft community, as most of its members understand the necessity to adapt their behaviour to minimise potential national security risks, for example during the active phase of “Zapad-2017”.

Since 2016, discussions have been taking place over the need to legally regulate military simulation games. In 2017, groups working on legislation (including representatives from the military simulation game community) continued meeting under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. The lack of regulations continues to cause misunderstandings in society in relation to this hobby.

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

- In order for Russia to further its political interests, it requires the support of compatriot activists who live abroad. Considering Latvia’s historic ties and geographical proximity, Russia will continue its attempts to use the local Russian community to influence Latvia’s domestic affairs. It is anticipated that Russia will continue exploiting its compatriots to preserve and disseminate interpretations of history favourable to Russia, just as it exploits supporters of the regime in Russia itself for these ends. These activities have proven to be effective tools for furthering Russia’s humanitarian influence, since they are able to provide a personal (family-based) link with Russia. The side effects of this include forcing Russia’s historical interpretations onto others, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the state of Latvia and belittling the process of regaining independence.
- The Russian compatriot activist environment in Latvia will remain fragmented, since it depends on the limited resources of institutions in Russia implementing compatriot policy, and individual activists and organisations will continue competing for the same meagre resources.
- In 2018, the main challenges in protecting the constitutional order will be in relation to Latvia’s centenary celebrations and the 13th Saeima elections. During these events, activities by various persons and organisations threatening the constitutional order could increase.

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6 Radical and extremist groups and individuals are both characterised by heightened intolerance against the existing political and social order of society. Radical individuals and groups tend to work within the existing system while attempting to change the system to reflect their ideological model, whereas extremists reject the prevailing system as a whole, attempting to change it using extreme, illegal and often violent methods.
• Russian compatriot activists will continue to raise the issue of the transition to Latvian instruction in general education institutions as actively in 2018 as they did last year, and LKS will exploit this in its election campaign.

• In 2018, compatriot activists will continue their involvement in Russia’s information campaigns against Latvia. It is anticipated that the military units stationed in Latvia as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence will continue to be prime targets of this campaign, in an attempt to discredit Latvia’s defensive efforts and our allies.

• The risk posed to Latvia’s national security by right- and left-wing extremists remains low. In the immediate future, low level threats will continue to be posed by ideologically-motivated online groups and some isolated individuals.

• The activities of paramilitary movements and organisations continue to pose moderate radicalisation risks, primarily for some individual members of this environment. The risks could be further reduced by stricter regulation of such groups.
3. Security of the information space

During the last year to provide active and regular support to strengthening Russia’s informational influence beyond its borders, including in Latvia, a wide range of information resources continued their activities. The content of these resources continued to present both messages discrediting Latvia and its allies which were already identified in previous DP reports, as well as interpretations of events not based on factually correct information and so-called fake news. DP considers that these conditions gave Russia multifaceted influence on Latvia’s information space and in forming the views and attitudes of various social groups, thereby providing significant support to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.

Since developments in the information space are increasingly influencing political and economic processes, DP made analysis of this situation a priority in the last year. DP also continued informing responsible state officials about the identified threats and making recommendations on overcoming these risks.

3.1. Russia’s information influence channels in Latvia’s information space

The use of informational measures, i.e. propaganda campaigns targeted at foreign audiences has become a key element of Russia’s foreign policy. In the last year, there were few changes in the methods employed in propaganda campaigns, including those targeting Latvia, involving all manner of information resources both funded by the Russian government, as well as those only indirectly connected to the government authorities of Russia (hereinafter – informational resources used by Russia.) However, an increasing role in Russia’s informational measures was given to seemingly independent information exchange platforms, such as popular social networks.

Russia’s information space policy is set out in a number of strategic documents, such as the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted at the end of 2016. These documents reveal the Kremlin’s readiness to exploit the latest information and communication technologies and forms of communication to strengthen its information influence abroad. By stressing in its information security doctrine the need to create a “management system for Russia’s internet segment” in order to guarantee “information security and strategic stability”, Russia has created the preconditions for the enhanced control of “internet sites and communication networks” in its jurisdiction. Amendments entering into force in January 2017 to Russia’s Federal Law “On information, information technologies and information security” and the Administrative Code may be viewed as the practical implementation of the strategic guidelines set out in Russia’s Doctrine of Information Security. These amendments impose liability on search engines such as “Yandex” and “Rambler” for the content they disseminate. This allows the Russian authorities to interfere with the content of search engines and influence the flow of information in these internet resources in line with the Kremlin’s political objectives.

In the last year, the FSB ramped up its activities in the internet and telecommunications sphere, where its influence was enforced by the System of Operative-Investigative Measures (SORM, in Russian - Система оперативно-разыскных мероприятий). Last year also saw preparations for the next stage of SORM, under which Russia’s biggest social networks (“VKontakte”, “Odnoklassniki”, “Yandex”, “Rambler”, “Mail.ru” and “Telegram”) will have to provide any data requested by the FSB.
From 1 July 2018, Russia’s social networks will have to store all user e-communication and video conference calls for at least six months. The 2017 amendments to the Law “On information, information technologies and information security” also impose the obligation on enterprises registered in Russia as “information dissemination organisers”, for example mobile app developers, not to allow these apps to be used anonymously. The amendments also force app developers to identify users by their phone numbers.

It is also noteworthy that in recent years Russia has strengthened its so-called “data localisation” rules. For example, these oblige internet companies to store data about Russian clients on servers in Russia. The aforementioned affirms that with the adoption of information space policy documents, Russia is not only very actively implementing its propaganda campaigns for abroad, it is also controlling and censoring the flow of information through the “management system for Russia’s internet segment”. These amendments significantly strengthen the control of the Russian authorities over the information flow in Russia’s segment of the world wide web, as well as open up the possibility for Russia’s intelligence and security services to obtain pre-emptive information and metadata about residents of Latvia who are registered with the respective portals, revealing their social links and contact persons in Russia and creating opening for establishing operational contacts. As a result, consumers of Russian information sources must realise how easily Russia’s intelligence and security services can access their private data.

In 2017, Russia exploited a broad range of information resources and other communication and information exchange platforms for its propaganda objectives:

- “traditional” media including TV channels, radio stations and the press;
- so-called internet media, such as internet sites and blogs;
- communication and information exchange platforms such as social networks.

The so-called traditional media include television channels from Russia that are widely available in Latvia, which for several years were the main instruments through which the Kremlin tried to influence the information space abroad, including in Latvia. As in previous years, 2017 also saw Russia’s TV channels, which are owned by the Kremlin or persons close to it, broadcast manipulative and highly biased reports on events and stories in Latvia. In these reports, there was a systematic practice of presenting Russia’s compatriot policy representatives and pro-Kremlin activists in Latvia such as A. Gaponenko, V. Lindermans and Juris Aleksejevs as opinion leaders rather than independent experts.

Ownership of Russian TV channels which are popular in Latvia:

- Первый канал is owned by the Federal State Property Management Agency (38.9%), the media holding “Национальная Медиа Группа” (25%), Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich (24%), the information agency “Tass” (9.1%) and the enterprise “Останкино” (3%);
- The owner of “НТВ-Мир” is the Russian media holding company “Газпром-Медиа” (100%);
- The owner of “Рен ТВ” is the Russian media holding company “Национальная Медиа Группа” (100%);
- The owner of “Россия-РТР” is the All-Russia State Television and Radio Company “Национальная Медиа Группа” (100%).
Russian TV producers also involved persons living in Latvia in preparing reports about Latvia. For example, “HTB-Map” regularly used reports by Latvian resident Andrejs Hramcovs. In DP’s assessment, these reports, covering subjects such as Latvia’s attempts to calculate the damage caused by the Soviet occupation and the gradual transition to Latvian as the language of teaching in general educational schools, were biased and shaped in favour of Russia’s political interests.

In the last year, several Russian information platforms specially adapted for the audience in Latvia have continued to operate, which systematically integrated Russian propaganda messages and interpretations of events. For example, the Latvia version of the Rossiya Segodnya-funded multimedia platform Sputnik continued maintaining websites in both Latvian and Russian languages. In 2017, Valentin Rozhentsov continued working as editor-in-chief of the Sputnik Latvia version while mainly residing in Moscow.

The work of the Sputnik Latvia version demonstrated that its main objective is providing information support for Russia in furthering its political interests in Latvia. Given that the Sputnik Latvia version’s sole source of funding is from Rossiya Segodnya (rather than being a fully-fledged player in Latvia’s media market), its content developers could afford to create biased or factually incorrect reports on politics, economics and defence in Latvia. Moreover, despite its low viewership and minimal public interest in its content, the regular updating of the Sputnik Latvia version’s website indicates that the management of Rossiya Segodnya will continue to support the project.

In the last year, the team of content developers at the Sputnik Latvia version was joined by Dimitry Yermolayev, who was included in 2005 on the initiative of SAB on the list of persons barred from entering Latvia. In addition to preparing materials discrediting Latvia for the Sputnik Latvia version, D.Yermolayev is also editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine in Russia “РОССИЙСКИЕ ВЕСТИ”. D.Yermolayev and Andrey Tatarchuk, a journalist working in Latvia, were barred from entering Moldova in May 2017. Information available to DP indicates that they were planning to visit the Transnistrian Republic established by pro-Kremlin separatists to obtain materials for a book these persons are writing about events in Latvia in 1990 and 1991, including the Barricades period. DP considers that attempts to discredit Latvia’s independence movement are part of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign against Latvia, which also involves members of Russia’s intelligence and security services.

In parallel with the Sputnik Latvia version, the Rossiya Segodnya-funded website baltnews.lv also continued operating in 2017, whose editor-in-chief remains Andrey Yakovlev. DP considers that this information resource also continued to circulate information favourable to Russia’s geopolitical interests in Latvia’s information space.

In terms of strengthening Russia’s informational influence in Latvia, a particular role was assigned to the targeted use of the so-called opinion leaders and “experts”, for which J.Aleksejevs’ website imhoclub.lv proved useful. Last year, this site continued to chiefly serve as a platform for exchanging views between Russian compatriot activists. The site also actively disseminated articles by Russian “historians”, “academics”, “political scientists” and other “experts”. Information available to DP indicates that imhoclub.lv is funded from sources in Russia.

The Russian information agency Rossiya Segodnya was established on the orders of Russian President Vladimir Putin on 9 December 2013. Its general director is Dimitry Kiselyov. On the basis of the European Union regulation adopted on 17 March 2014 imposing sanctions for actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Rossiya Segodnya has been refused permission to register a representative office in Latvia.

The following internet platforms funded by Rossiya Segodnya operate in Latvia’s information space: the Sputnik Latvia version (since 2016) and baltnews.lv (since 2014).

Russia’s propaganda campaign in Latvia also makes use of developments in information and communications technologies to disseminate information, for example via the popular Western social networks Twitter and Facebook. Over the last year, new users were identified on these networks with genuine or false identities who regularly disseminated Russian propaganda information. DP considers that these profiles do not just reflect expressions of dissatisfaction by individuals in Latvia’s civil society. The activities and content dissemination methods employed by a number of Twitter and Facebook users suggest a connected, systematic and coordinated range of measures to influence Latvia’s information space in favour of Russia’s geopolitical interests.

The aforementioned social media activities involved the participation of pro-Kremlin activists in Latvia, internet trolls and bots, tasked with creating, disseminating and multiplying masses of information favourable to the Kremlin’s current political objectives and undermining discussions on social media. Russian trolls and bots were also regularly used to spread content produced by Russian information resources, thereby creating the illusion that such content enjoys public support and ensuring that it makes its way to a greater number of media consumers.

For example, last year there were several cases where unrelated Twitter profiles spread identical information discrediting Latvia. Such activities are characteristic of bots, and most likely these anti-Latvia tweets were also computer generated.

Some examples of potential web bot activities spreading tweets about Latvia.
3.2. Cases of disinformation and spreading false information

As in previous years, in 2017 information resources used by Russia continued to systematically spread messages about Latvia, such as:

- A potential staging ground for military aggression by NATO against Russia;
- An economically weak, unstable, failed state whose own inhabitants question its right to existence and statehood and whose economic development depends solely on relations with Russia;
- An ethnocratic, Russophobic regime which denies rights to Russians;
- A place where fascism and Nazism are being reborn.

“Звезда” is a television channel funded by Russia’s Ministry of Defence, which is used for the regular, systematic dissemination of Russian propaganda. “Звезда” describes itself as a “patriotic” TV channel, and it is regarded as the Russian media outlet with the most aggressive attitude toward the West, and particularly NATO. In 2017, “Звезда” aired a number of biased reports about events in Latvia.

These messages were regularly supplemented by systematic disinformation campaigns. In other words, manipulative information and in several cases outright lies were used to disseminate them in the information space.

Last year, information resources used by Russia continued to systematically cast defensive measures by Latvia and NATO in an aggressive light, in order to reinforce the absurd belief amongst the Russian-speaking audience that NATO and the Baltic states are “planning and preparing for military aggression against Russia”. The creators of this content used a number of methods to structure and reinforce it.

Firstly, extensive use was made of various opinion leaders and “experts” as well as Russian state officials whose statements and opinions are treated as “facts”. For example, last year stories were spread about the positioning of nuclear weapons in Latvia.

Secondly, efforts by Latvian officials to strengthen Latvia’s defence capabilities were framed in accordance with Russia’s geopolitical interests. For example, commenting on the new mobilisation plan for the National Armed Forces (hereinafter – NBS) adopted by Latvia’s government on 31 October 2017, Sputnik’s Latvia version reported on the supposed “main direction of attack by the NBS” entailed in the document. Despite the fact that Latvia’s Mobilisation Law stipulates that mobilisation is “measures for the prevention of threats to the state”, this information resource dedicated to supporting Russia’s foreign policy objectives deliberately distorted facts about Latvia’s defensive plans, constructing an absurd scenario about a potential attack by the Latvian army on Russia.

Economics and related issues are given increasing prominence in Russia’s informational activities against Latvia. Last year, economic issues were mainly used to paint Latvia as an economically weak, experimental state, as well as depicting the European Union as unstable and with a cloudy future. To this end, emotional claims and epithets and dubious statistics were deployed to cast Latvia as the “weakest state” with the “highest unemployment”, the “lowest wages”, etc.

Last year, there were also attempts to show that EU membership has only brought negative consequences for the Baltic States and hinders their economic growth. This discourse also reminds the audience of Latvia’s “acute” reliance on economic ties with Russia and Latvia’s “economic prosperity during the Soviet period”. DP considers that such narrative construction methods could potentially find root in the audience’s consciousness, undermining trust in the long-term in the state of Latvia and its sustainability and in Latvia’s economic partners.
Russian information resources also continued with the theme of Latvia as “a state run by an ethnocratic and Russophobe regime”.

A number of political and social events were used to propagate this message, including the gradual transition to Latvian as the language of teaching in general educational institutions. Reports and publications on this subject are replete with emotional hyperbole, comparing the reforms to genocide and the Holocaust. DP considers that these messages are intended to back up other claims made against Latvia and to discredit Latvia internationally, as well as to position Russia as the “protector” of ethnic Russians in Latvia, thereby justifying its attempts to interfere in Latvia’s domestic affairs. Russian information resources paid little attention to actually analysing education-related issues and problems.

Messages about Latvia’s “Russophobia” were also conveyed in reports on the arrest and expulsion of Russian journalists Anatoly and Olga Kurlayev at the beginning of the year. Under cover of tourist visas, these persons entered Latvia in order to prepare reports for Russian television discrediting Latvia based on manipulative and false information. On the recommendation of DP, in 2015 the Minister for Interior had placed A.Kurlayev on the list of persons denied entry to Latvia as a threat to Latvia’s national security. The reaction of Russia’s mass media to the arrest of the Kurlayevs must be considered in the context of Russia’s Information Security Doctrine adopted at the end of 2016. The doctrine identifies the “discrimination in foreign countries” of Russian journalists as one of the threats to Russia’s information security.

Russia’s propaganda campaigns have traditionally used various practical and informational methods to indoctrinate society in Latvia with a historical memory in line with Russia’s political objectives, particularly in relation to the events of the Second World War. The commonly employed theme of the “rebirth of fascism” in Latvia was used last year in connection with the 16 March Latvian Legionnaires Remembrance Day events as well as the so-called “Victory Day” celebrations in Riga and other Latvian cities.
Last year, there were also several identified attempts to link Latvia’s independence celebrations with the “rebirth of fascism”. For example, a number of Russian media outlets, including the TV channel “Звезда”, claimed that a torchlight procession in Riga during last November’s Independence Day celebrations was “proof of support for the Nazi ideology” within Latvia. The website “baltijalv.lv”, which has been established in Latvia, claimed that the 11 November torchlight procession was “held to commemorate Waffen SS legionnaires”.

Russian information resources also construed the aforementioned education reforms as part of the “rebirth of fascism”. For example, Sputnik’s Latvia version sought to connect Latvia’s educational policies with the language policies implemented by the government of Ukraine, which are also systematically framed as “fascist”. DP considers that the use of the “rebirth of fascism” narrative to link it to widely diverse events reflects a biased and uncritical distortion of the term “fascist”. It is used to provide a simple explanation for events in Latvian and international politics to the consumers of Russian information resources. Last year, the term “Russophobia” played a similar function in the content of Russian information resources, i.e. any action that did not align with Russia’s interests could be cited as another example of “Russophobia”.

**CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK**

- Russia’s information influence activities, including use of internet trolls and bots, are aimed at flooding Latvia’s information space with manipulated information. The objective of these measures is to create public opinion in Latvia favourable to Russia’s geopolitical interests, including views of Latvia’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, governmental authority, administrative structure and national security.

- Analysis of Latvia’s information space in the last year reveals that Russian-language information resources produced locally in Latvia also produce messages supporting Russia’s geopolitical interests and foreign policy goals. Therefore, those members of Latvia’s society who only consume Russian-language media had limited access to qualitative content free from foreign propaganda.

- It is vital for the security of Latvia’s information space that residents understand the real objectives of information resources used by Russia. Initiatives raising the media literacy of society are also important.

- The extensive presence in Latvia’s information space of information resources spreading Russian propaganda is also a direct threat to Latvia’s media environment. Such activities clearly undermine the reputation of media which are based in Latvia and free of Russian propaganda and erode trust in the information conveyed by such media. Since independent, strong media are one of the pillars of a democratic society, the ability of Latvia’s media environment to self-regulate is vital to the security of Latvia’s information space and preventing the methods used by Russian information resources (for example, spreading lies and disinformation or buying content) from becoming generally-accepted practice.
Information available to DP does not indicate that Russia’s information influence activities will subside in 2018. On the contrary, international experience shows that as the Saeima elections in the autumn approach, Russian information resources may provide a useful platform for even more concerted efforts to influence public opinion in Latvia in accordance with the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals.

At the same time, it must also be borne in mind that attempts by Russian information resources to influence decision making in Latvia will fail if they are opposed by a united, educated society which is able to identify the many cases of disinformation and distance itself from the resources pushing this content.
Last year, terrorism remained one of the main threats to European security. Although the terrorism threat level remains low in Latvia, the diversity and prevalence of terrorism on the continent means that it remains a long-term risk factor which may also affect our own national security. Therefore, obtaining preemptive information about the radicalisation of Latvian residents, cooperation with foreign partner services and developing the anti-terrorism system in line with current terrorism trends remained a priority for DP in 2017.

As the main body coordinating counterterrorism measures in Latvia, in 2017 DP continued building interinstitutional cooperation between organisations involved in counterterrorism measures, improving their capacity to perform preventative and reactive measures in case of heightened terrorism threats. DP also monitored critical infrastructure and places of mass gathering and made recommendations for improving security at these sites. The annual large-scale counter-terrorism exercise “Hermejs 2017” was carried out in conjunction with the “Mols” shopping centre. This exercise tested the ability of institutions engaged in counterterrorism measures to react in the event of a terrorist attack on a place where people are gathered in large numbers.

4.1. Terrorism threat trends in Europe

In the last year, terrorism incidents of varying scales and types occurred in several European countries. Major terrorist attacks with many victims occurred in Britain, Sweden and Spain. Islamist terrorists also continued staging attacks on European citizens elsewhere in the world. Information available to DP indicates that last year 20 terrorist attacks were staged in a number of European countries, of which five were large-scale attacks. European intelligence and security services were able to prevent at least 37 terror attacks, and persons involved in supporting terrorism were detained in a number of counterterrorism operations.

As in previous years, in 2017 the greatest terrorism threats to European security continued to come from the Islamist terrorist group Daesh, whose proclaimed ideology served to radicalise dozens of European Muslims and incite them to terrorism. There were also continuing threats from so-called homegrown terrorists conducting solo attacks.

Analysis of terrorist acts either planned or carried out in Europe reveals that the terrorism threat situation has become even more complex, as Islamist terrorists continue seeking new methods and targets for attacks. Last year Islamists most commonly carried out attacks using hand-held weapons (knives and machetes) or driving into crowds of people. The use of improvised explosives is also prevalent. There was also a rise in the number of attacks where Islamist terrorists used various methods simultaneously, such as driving into a crowd and wielding hand-held weapons. The most common attack targets continue to be places of mass gathering, such as relatively accessible pedestrian streets. Given the relatively simplicity of carrying out such attacks, their potential number of victims and anticipated publicity, it is expected that attacks on places of mass gathering will continue in the future.

Despite the fact that military setbacks for Daesh in 2017 hampered its ability to plan and carry out attacks in Europe, the group continued to disseminate propaganda to convince its supporters living in Europe to carry out attacks in their countries of residence. DP considers that the availability of Islamist terrorist propaganda on the internet increases the risk of radicalising persons. The internet continues to be the key platform...
Five major terrorist attacks were carried out in Europe in 2017:

- On 22 March in London, a man drove into people on a pedestrian street before continuing the attack using knives;
- On 7 April in Stockholm an attacker drove into a crowd of people;
- On 22 May in Manchester, an improvised explosive device was set off during a concert;
- On 3 June in London, several attackers drove into people on a pedestrian street before continuing their attacks with knives;
- On 17 August in Barcelona, an attacker drove into a crowd of people on a popular pedestrian street.

for terrorists to actively and aggressively disseminate their propaganda. Moreover, Daesh publishes its internet propaganda in several languages, and its supporters further translate it into the dominant languages of their countries of residence, thus helping to spread the propaganda even further. In its propaganda materials, Daesh provides detailed descriptions of options for attacks as well as ideological motivation for its supporters.

The events of recent years have shown that Islamists living in Europe can become radicalised quite quickly, in just a few weeks, and decide to carry out attacks. Moreover, most cases of radicalisation occur individually.

4.2. Terrorism threat trends in Latvia

Last year, there were no terrorist attacks in Latvia. However, information available to DP indicates that several Latvian residents continue to reside in terrorist-controlled regions where they are involved in terrorist activities. The service also continues to monitor several Latvian residents whose stated views indicate a risk of radicalisation.

In 2017, Latvia’s Muslim community mainly engaged in private activities and did not have a direct impact on security. The vast majority of Muslims in Latvia are law abiding, loyal members of society. However, DP has identified several members of the community who take an interest in radical interpretation of Islam. DP considers that the radicalisation of these Latvian Muslims is not encouraged by the interpretation of Islam preached in the local prayer houses. Instead, potential radicalisation is influenced by personal and external factors such as studying in countries where terrorist groups are present, encountering radical interpretation of Islam in prison or encountering propaganda from Daesh or other terrorist groups on the internet.

Persons may be at risk of radicalisation regardless of their gender, age, ethnic background or profession. One of the main risk groups in Latvia are converts. Several converts, both males and females, have travelled to Syria and joined Daesh. Moreover, several converts living in Latvia have been observed showing interest in the ideology and activities of Daesh, therefore these persons are at risk of further radicalisation. DP considers that Latvian converts studying in countries where terrorist groups are present are also at risk of radicalisation through exposure to radical interpretation of Islam. Trends also show there are radicalisation risks for converts in prison and converts with mental health issues.

To date, DP has initiated criminal proceedings in four cases under Section 77 of the Criminal Law for illegal participation in the armed conflict in Syria. Information available to DP indicates that several members of Latvia’s Muslim community are currently in Syria/Iraq. These persons may have been involved in the armed conflict there, or carried out various support activities, such as distributing Daesh propaganda. The former head of Latvia’s Islamic Culture Centre Olegs Petrovs continues to reside in Syria/Iraq. He has remained an authority figure amongst some Latvian Muslims and continues to disseminate Daesh propaganda in Latvian and Russian.

In November 2017, a court of the second instance sentenced Mārtiņš Grīnbergs, a “returnee” from Syria, to ten years and three months of imprisonment for illegal participation in the war in Syria and membership of a criminal organisation. The sentence is subject to pending appeal, however investigations conducted in this case revealed that the extensive propaganda materials online can also radicalise Latvian Muslims.

4.3. Entry control of foreigners

DP is part of the system of controlling the entry of foreigners, conducting checks of foreigners from countries where terrorist groups are present or have other terrorism-related risks. Compared with 2016, in 2017 there was a significant decrease in demand for visas and residence permits from these countries. In 2017, 1 142 visa invitations and applications for permanent residence permits were checked for a total of 2 115 persons. In addition, DP also checked 2 235 visa applications and 660 residence permit applications by foreigners.

As a result of the checks, in 172 cases DP recommended refusing visas, in five cases reducing the number of days permitted to stay, and in 37 cases granted approval subject to

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8 The list of countries whose citizens are additionally checked upon issuance of visa or residence permit is determined by regulations No.554 of 21.06.2010. of the Cabinet of Ministers “Regulations on countries whose citizens are additionally checked upon the issuance of visa or residence permit”. 

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specific conditions imposed by DP. Of the checked applications for residence permits, in 27 cases it was recommended that the applications be rejected, and in 161 cases they were approved with other comments.

The foreigners being checked fell into four main categories—tourists, students, employees and company managers. Studying at Latvia’s universities was one of the main reason why persons from countries with a heightened presence of terrorist groups travelled to Latvia. There is still a risk that radically-inclined persons may enter Latvia by posing as students. Since this would allow such persons to also freely travel to other Schengen zone countries, carefully checking such persons is vital for the security of Latvia and Europe as a whole.

Terrorism threat trend analysis reveals that terrorist organisations may also use refugee flows to send potential terrorists to Europe. Therefore, last year DP continued in-depth evaluations of asylum seekers. In 2017, DP conducted checks on 395 asylum seekers. Thirty-one persons from risk countries (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bangladesh and others) requested asylum in Latvia (compared with 57 persons in 2016), and DP recommended rejecting the asylum applications of 21 persons. However, the conducted checks did not find evidence of these persons belonging to or supporting terrorist groups and/or radical organisations.

Last year, DP also continued checking those asylum seekers transferred or resettled from Greece, Italy and Turkey.
under the European Union’s programme for the transfer and resettlement of asylum seekers. Accordingly, DP in cooperation with the State Border Guard and the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs performed selection and checking of the asylum seekers to be transferred and resettled. As part of the selection and checking procedure, in cooperation with Latvia’s Embassy in Turkey, DP interviewed the asylum seekers. Last year, DP conducted checks on a total of 142 asylum seekers to be transferred and resettled, comprising about one third (35.9%) of all checked asylum seekers. The checks did not produce any information about possible risks posed by the asylum seekers which would bar these persons from being transferred or resettled in Latvia.

4.4. Preventative measures

Last year, DP continued working to develop the preventative national counter-terrorism system. In 2017, in cooperation with other state institutions, DP developed support plans for the National Counter-Terrorism Plan, which stipulates measures to be carried out by responsible institutions in case of elevated, high or severe terrorism threat levels.

To test the ability of the institutions in the counter-terrorism system to react in the event of a terrorist incident, in September 2017 DP organised the national counterterrorism training “Hermejs 2017”. The exercise was held inside the “Mols” shopping centre in Riga and involved more than 300 persons from ten institutions. During the exercise, a broad range of counterterrorism measures were implemented, including informing relevant institutions, arrival and stationing of personnel and equipment at the site, obtaining and analysing information about the threat, decision making and coordination, as well as planning and implementing a hostage-rescue operation, providing medical assistance and conducting investigative work. Based on the post training conclusions action mechanisms and cooperation procedures were improved, to ensure the best possible responsiveness of institutions engaged in counterterrorism measures in case of terrorism threat.

In 2017, DP also organised the table-top exercise “Red Code 2017” for institutions involved in counterterrorism preventative measures. The goal of the exercise was to test the ability of the institutions to heighten their preventative counter-terrorism measures if the terrorism threat level is
raised. The event also fostered the understanding of the relevant institutions about inter-service cooperation, with particular emphasis on the distribution of resources if there are different terrorism threat levels in various regions of the country.

Last year, DP officials also continued to monitor security at critical infrastructure objects. In total, 46 critical infrastructure objects were inspected, and 18 recommendations were made to improve security regime at these objects. The service also held events to educate staff at critical infrastructure objects and places of mass gathering, commercial organisations selling explosive precursors, and employees and officials from state institutions about counter-terrorism security issues. In total, 926 persons took part in such events.

In addition, a series of seminars was held to inform officials from municipalities and representatives of regional bodies of various state institutions about counter-terrorism issues. Over 100 persons took part in seven such seminars. During the reporting period, seminars were also held for representatives of Riga’s biggest shopping malls, the Latvian Hotels and Restaurants Association, and employees of security companies. The seminar participants were informed about current terrorism threat trends in Europe, and DP explained its role in planning and implementing physical security measures at places of mass gathering.

DP also continued working with the general public as well as specific groups whose members may regularly come into contact with radicalised persons. The purpose of this is to inform them of signs indicating that a person has been radicalised and to increase the public’s ability to react promptly when it encounters radicalisation risks. In 2017, DP prepared several materials addressing terrorism-related issues, which are available on the service’s website.

Last year, DP also continued to work on the national contact point established in 2015 for reporting suspicious activities with explosives precursors, including cases of theft and loss. The service held seminars to inform representatives of companies involved in distributing explosives precursors about current issues, as well as educating them about identifying suspicious transactions and what to do in the event of the theft or loss of explosives precursors.

4.5. Development of the airline Passenger Data Register

In 2017, DP continued improving the Airline Passenger Data Register (hereinafter – the Register). The Register is a state information system designed to identify persons involved in terrorist activities or other serious crimes and provide required information to competent state institutions for the prevention and detection of terrorism or other serious or particularly serious crimes and for preventing threats to national security.

The Aircraft Passenger Data Processing Law came into force on 3 April 2017, making it mandatory for airlines to send passenger data for automated inclusion in the Register. Moreover, a European Commission Implementing Decision (2017/759) was adopted on 28 April, making it mandatory for EU member states to ensure that airlines can submit passenger data via specific data channels and formats. To ensure compliance and transposing into national laws of both the Implementing Decision and Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, work to improve the Register was undertaken, and respective amendments to national laws were drafted in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior.

Work was also done last year on integrating the Register with airline reservation and departure control systems by identifying and implementing required system adjustments. Testing was carried out on receiving and checking data from several airlines. There was also multifaceted system functionality testing of the Register to identify necessary improvements. These improvements are aimed at reducing the administrative burden on airlines and ensuring observance of personal data protection and information security requirements.

In 2017, DP continued working with MIDD, SAB and law enforcement bodies to explain the functionality of the Register and the procedure for receiving airline passenger data. Only competent institutions as stipulated in the Aircraft Passenger Data Processing Law backed by a judge’s authorisation will be permitted to receive information about passengers from the system.

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9 See the section “Informative materials” on the DP website. Available at: http://www.dp.gov.lv/lv/noderigi/informativi-materiali/.
The loss of control over large areas of Syria and Iraq has hindered the ability of Daesh to directly train fighters to carry out attacks in Europe. However, Daesh continues to actively produce and disseminate propaganda aimed at radicalising persons in Europe and encouraging them to carry out terrorist attacks. This means that the security situation in Europe will not improve in the foreseeable future. Instead, it is anticipated that Islamist terrorists will continue to seek new approaches and methods to make attacks in Europe.

Analysis of terror attacks planned or carried out in Europe last year indicates that Islamist terrorists mainly planned or carried out attacks using hand-held weapons or by driving into crowds. Therefore it can be concluded that Islam terrorists are searching for the simplest ways to carry out acts of terrorism. However, long-term terrorist threat trends suggest that terrorists will also continue using firearms and improvised explosive devices.

Converts are one of the groups in Latvia at the greatest risk of radicalisation or involvement in terrorist activities. Case analysis indicates that persons who study in countries with a heightened terrorist organisations’ presence, come into contact with radical interpretation of Islam in prison or encounter terrorist propaganda online will continue to be at increased risk of radicalisation.

International experience and DP analysis shows that propaganda spread by Daesh is a specific heightened risk factor. Therefore, considering the interest shown by several members of Latvia’s Moslem community in the ideology and activities of Daesh, the possibility that some Muslims living in Latvia could become involved in terrorist activities cannot be dismissed.

The risk remains that radically inclined persons could enter Latvia from terrorism-prone countries under the guise of being students. International experience shows that foreign students from countries with a heightened terrorist organisations’ presence are a group with a high risk of radicalisation who may potentially become involved in terrorist activities.
5. Economic security

In the sphere of economic sovereignty, there were several significant developments last year with the potential to improve Latvia’s long-term economic security and restrict the ability of undesirable foreign interests to gain influence over strategic sectors of the economy. These included amendments adopted by the Saeima to the National Security Law, which stipulate that certain commercial enterprises are important to national security and impose certain restrictions on them. These amendments also allow the government to decide whether certain persons are permitted to gain significant influence over commercial enterprises which are important to national security. This means that the state will be able to more effectively protect national economic and security interests in areas such as the natural gas and electricity markets, telecommunications and information. The amendments also give additional responsibilities on the service to evaluate risks associated with potential changes to commercial enterprises which are important to national security.

Maintaining economic sovereignty remained a significant factor in ensuring national security in 2017, therefore DP made this a priority area, with particular emphasis on implementing counterintelligence and operational measures. DP also provided analyses to top state officials about the impact of current events on national economic sovereignty and national security as a whole.

In the field of economic security, DP also continued monitoring foreign investors, paying particular attention to foreigners investing in Latvia in order to obtain a temporary residence permit (hereinafter – TRP).

5.1. Energy security

Last year, liberalisation of the natural gas market in Latvia continued, which has the long-term potential to significantly improve Latvia’s economic security.

Pursuant to amendments to the Energy Law adopted in 2016, as of 3 April 2017, natural gas may be traded in Latvia by any company which is registered on the gas traders register and has concluded a contract with transmission and distribution service providers. Following these changes, other significant steps were taken towards market liberalisation, including the reorganisation of JSC “Latvijas Gāze”. In 2016, a new company called JSC “Conexus Baltic Grid” was established, which took over key assets of JSC “Latvijas Gāze” – the Inčukalns underground gas storage reservoir and gas mainlines. Therefore, JSC “Conexus Baltic Grid” has become the operator of the Inčukalns facility, which is strategically important for the entire Baltic region.

However, although the natural gas market in Latvia has been formally liberalised, competition is relatively limited in this market. DP considers that it is important that the liberalisation process be continued to ensure that Latvian consumers have a choice of competitive offers from a range of natural gas trading companies.

Under the natural gas market liberalisation process, by the end of 2017 shareholders in JSC “Conexus Baltic Grid” who were also shareholders in JSC “Latvijas Gāze” had to sell
their stakes in the company. In order to protect Latvia’s national interests and retain influence over the use of the Inčukalns facility, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to exercise its first purchaser rights and made an offer to the shareholders in JSC “Conexus Baltic Grid” to purchase their shares. At the end of 2017, the companies “Uniper Ruhrgas International GmbH” and “Itera Latvija” Ltd. agreed to sell their shares in JSC “Conexus Baltic Grid” to the state. DP made an assessment of the potential risks of this transaction and reported to the responsible decision makers. DP considers that following this deal, consequent policies must be implemented to ensure that the Inčukalns facility becomes a key element in a unified Baltic energy market, offering other countries in the region the opportunity to store their natural gas reserves there. DP will continue monitoring issues relating to gas market liberalisation in 2018.

5.2. Transit

There were no significant changes compared with previous years for the transit sector, which continues to rely heavily on cargoes from Russia. There was a continued reduction of transit volumes through Latvia’s transit corridor in 2017, which was mainly felt by the national rail system and the three biggest ports. This trend was already noticeable before and relates to Russia’s long-term policy of reorienting cargo shipments to its own ports. At the same time, the rate of decline in cargo volumes from Russia became more acute. Russia continued to systematically divert cargoes from the transit corridors of the Baltic States to its own ports, and this process was further influenced by the intermingling of various political and economic factors. Together with economic considerations, Russia’s actions in restricting cargo volumes going via Latvia was also affected by political decisions which were implemented using administrative measures. In other words, Russia increased administrative pressure so that cargo owners in Russia would decide to break their cooperation with Latvian port terminals

Nevertheless, the overall rate of decline in cargo volumes in the Latvian transit corridor can be regarded as moderate. This trend could continue in the future, giving companies in Latvia’s transit sector and responsible state institutions time to react to the anticipated rate of decline and adapt to the new conditions. Activities aimed at maintaining a certain amount of Russian cargo flow to Latvia have not produced the desired results, therefore the sector must develop alternative transit and logistics services. The players in Latvia’s transit field will need to use this transition period to reorient their businesses, just as many manufacturers in other sectors have found new markets for their products.

However, developments in 2017 showed that attracting alternative providers of cargoes is a long-term process; for example, there was little progress in attracting Chinese cargoes. There is growing regional competition to attract cargoes, and Latvia’s neighbouring states are pursuing similar initiatives.

There were also positive trends, such as an increase in road haulage cargo volumes and shipping container volumes on Latvian railways. This shows that there are sufficient cargoes in both regional and more distant markets, but one must be able to adapt and compete to attract them.

DP considers that the “Rail Baltica” project is an opportunity on a national, regional and European scale, and could provide an alternative which would significantly improve Latvia’s overall economic security. In 2017, the parliaments of the Baltic States ratified an agreement reached earlier between their heads of government implementing “Rail Baltica”. This political decision is a positive signal for the future of “Rail Baltica”, however Latvia must be more active in driving the project forward, and there must be significant progress in implementing it in the next few years. DP considers there is a need for more efficient, qualitative management of the project, so that construction of railway infrastructure can begin in 2019. All parties involved must work together to see it implemented.

Illustrative image.

10 It was periodically observed in 2017 that the Russian state enterprise “Russian Railways” only partially filled orders from Latvia for railway wagons, thereby limiting the number of cargo wagons which could be sent to Latvia in a given 24-hour period.
5.3. Financial security

Thanks to the fine tuning of regulations governing the financial sector and supervision of the banking sector, last year the volume of non-resident deposits in Latvia’s commercial banks continued to decline. However, the presence of non-resident capital continued to pose a threat to the international reputation and trustworthiness of Latvia’s financial sector.

Inspections by the Financial and Capital Market Commission revealed breaches by some banks of regulations governing the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. As a result, several Latvian banks were fined and ordered to improve their internal procedures.

Despite attempts to improve supervision of the financial sector, last year some banks continued to focus their operations on servicing non-resident funds of dubious origin. Events which occurred this year have demonstrated that this model poses significant risks to the long-term sustainability of the banks at the international level. Due to these trends, supervision of Latvia’s financial system will remain a priority, and cooperation and information exchange with foreign partners will be crucial.

5.4. Temporary residence permits in exchange for investments

In 2017, DP continued its work conducting checks on foreigners applying for TRP in exchange for investments in Latvia under Section 23 Article 1 Paragraphs 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Immigration Law (hereinafter – TRP in exchange for investments). As the competent institution, DP evaluates the risks of issuing TRP to applicants and reports to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, which then decides on whether to issue a TRP, refuse a TRP or annul an already-issued TRP.

Last year, TRP in exchange for investments were issued to a total of 2,083 people in Latvia, with such a category of TRP issued for the first time to 424 persons (20% of the total). From the point of view of supervision, it is equally important to monitor persons reapplying for TRP. Last year, reissuing of TRP in exchange for investments was mainly to persons who first received TRP in 2012, and such TRP were reissued for a further five years to 1,659 persons. It is therefore logical that in 2017 the TRP dynamic was affected by the interest of persons who obtained TRP under this programme five years ago to extend it for another five years. Conversely, the number of foreigners wishing to obtain TRP in exchange for investments for the first time continued to decline.

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11 Section 23 Article 1 Paragraph 28 of the Immigration Law stipulates that TRP may be granted for a period not exceeding five years if the person has made investments into company equity (50,000-100,000 euros, depending on the number of employees and annual turnover) and paid 10,000 euros to the state budget; Paragraph 29 – if the person has purchased and owns in Latvia one functionally real estate valued at a minimum of 250,000 euros (or outside territories stipulated by the law two such properties with a total value of 250,000 euros), if other requirements under the law are also met; Paragraph 30 – if the person has relations with a Republic of Latvia credit institution of not less than 280,000 euros, and upon applying for TRP the person pays 25,000 euros to the state budget; Paragraph 31 – on the basis of interest-free investments in state bonds with a nominal value of 250,000 euros, paying 25,000 euros to the state budget.
There was little change in the level of interest of foreigners interested in receiving TRP in exchange for investments in real estate. However, the number of interested persons (1,891) does not mean significant investment in real estate, because as there were 302 such first-time TRP requests in 2017, encompassing not only investors, but also their family members who are eligible to apply for TRP without making investments. The next two most common categories in 2017 were investments in company equity and investments in bank subordinated capital, requested respectively by 109 and 62 persons, of whom 85 and 23 were first-time TRP applications. For investments in interest-free state bonds there were 21 applications for TRP, including 14 for the first time. Therefore, the trend observed in 2016 of a decline in the number of first-time applications by investors continued in 2017, which DP considers was due to both more careful scrutiny of the origins of applicants’ funds by Latvian institutions, as well as Russia’s unstable economic situation and changes in laws and regulations in Russia.

There was no significant change in the breakdown of TRP applicants by their countries of origin. Citizens of Russia continue to make up the bulk of TRP recipients with 1,493, or 73% of the total. Citizens of Ukraine remained in second place in 2017, with 128 persons (6%), followed by China with 113 (6%), Uzbekistan with 89 (4%), Kazakhstan with 87 (4%) and other countries with 152 (7%). It was noteworthy that 97 persons were from countries on the list of risk countries.

In 2017, based on available information, DP recommended to refuse TRPs to 26 foreigners. During the reporting period, DP continued to review the TRP of foreigners required to annually register for TRP. As a result of these checks, DP recommended to annul TRPs for 21 persons. TRPs were rejected or annulled on the grounds of negative information available DP or discovered risks to national security, which are legal grounds for restricting a foreigner’s rights to reside in Latvia, including access to TRP:

- In 72% of cases counterintelligence risks were discovered, i.e. the TRP applicant is or may be used by a foreign intelligence and security service for activities against the interests of Latvia;
- In 19% of cases economic risks were discovered, which were mostly based on suspicions that the person was involved in money laundering or criminal charges have been brought against the person in their home country for serious economic crimes;
- In 9% of cases other threats to national security were discovered, including risks to the constitutional order, for example the person had links to Russia’s compatriot policy.

DP considers that Latvia’s legal regulations currently reflect a reasonable balance between the need to attract foreign investment on the one hand and protection of national security on the other hand. Although there are occasional calls to review or reduce the stipulated amount if investment required for TRP, there are no grounds for doing this under present circumstances, as both the amount of investment and the supervision performed by the state must be of sufficient scope to deter foreigners from misusing this programme for their own interests.
The decision by the state to purchase part of the shares in JSC “Connexus Baltic Grid” is a significant step in ensuring that the state’s interests are represented in the natural gas market in Latvia in the long term. However, the procedure of disposing the shares in JSC “Connexus Baltic Grid” is still ongoing, and the company’s operational efficiency remains a topical issue.

Russia remains the main source of cargoes and an important partner for Latvian companies in the transit sector. However, the volume of cargoes from Russia will probably continue to decline, and it will become increasingly important to find alternative cargoes. The effective implementation of the “Rail Baltica” project is one of the means by which Latvia’s competitiveness could be raised in the future, therefore its continued development must be among transport development policy’s priorities.

The volume of investments by foreign clients in Latvia’s financial sector is still relatively high, and this is attracting the attention of our strategic partners. Therefore, this sphere requires stricter state supervision by state institutions to prevent damage to the country’s international relationships and reputation.

In line with forecasts, in 2017 there was a continuing decline in the number of foreigners making first-time applications for TRP in exchange for investments in Latvia. The sharpest drop in interest was for TRP in exchange for investments in real estate, while the number of persons interested in TRP in exchange for capital investments in companies remained stable. Given the political and economic situation in Russia, whose citizens continue to be the largest group of applicants for TRP in exchange for investments, DP considers that this trend will continue.

DP considers that Latvia’s current legal regulation of TRP in exchange for investments is sufficient to allow effective evaluation and prevention of related counter-intelligence risks, as well as risks to the economic and constitutional security.
6. Pre-trial investigation

In addition to counterintelligence and operational activities, DP also has the right to conduct pre-trial investigations. Since investigation is not a typical function for intelligence and security services, DP is assigned a narrow, specific competence in the criminal investigation sphere, i.e. investigating crimes which threaten state security and in state intelligence and security services, or crimes assigned for investigation to DP by the Prosecutor General. Moreover, DP is the only one of the three state intelligence and security services which has the right to conduct pre-trial investigations. Accordingly, in the last year DP mainly investigated crimes which threaten state security, for example, spying, disclosure of official secrets, breaching sanctions imposed by international bodies and the Republic of Latvia, illegally participating in armed conflict, etc.

During the last year, DP initiated 23 criminal proceedings, with a further four criminal proceedings transferred from other investigating bodies. As in prior periods, criminal proceedings were initiated based on information obtained by DP, submissions from natural persons or legal entities and information provided by other law enforcement bodies, as well as separating them from other criminal proceedings on the books of DP. In 37 cases, DP declined to initiate criminal proceedings because there were no grounds for initiating criminal proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Law.

DP has systematically worked to ensure that the criminal proceedings on its books align with its competence as an intelligence and security service, leading to a reduction in the number of criminal proceedings over the past year. At the same time, although the number of crimes under investigation has fallen, compared for example with 2014 when 44 criminal proceedings were initiated, over the last year the volume of investigation in criminal proceedings has grown significantly due to their complexity. In this regard, of particular note are categories of cases relating to spying, illegal disclosure of official secrets, breaching sanctions imposed by international organisations, as well as involvement by Latvian residents in criminal organisations outside Latvia or participating in armed conflicts in foreign countries.

The Republic of Latvia city and district council (municipal) elections were held on 3 June 2017, and DP paid particular attention to ensuring their proper conduct, investigating over 100 so-called signals on possible breaches which is in the service’s competence to investigate. Over half the signals were received on election day. After checking the information received, it transpired that most of the signals were not confirmed, however in seven cases DP began criminal proceedings to investigate further. At the time of publishing this report, three of the cases have been dropped due to lack of evidence of criminality, while two cases have been transferred to the prosecutor for criminal prosecution, and a further two are still under investigation.

At the time of publication, DP had also transferred to the Prosecution Office criminal proceedings for spying initiated against a Latvian citizen in late 2017, the second such case transferred to the Prosecution Office since the reestablishment of independence.

In the last year, DP transferred a total of nine criminal proceedings to the Prosecution Office to prosecute nine persons, of whom three were state officials. The said criminal proceedings included one for so-called vote buying during the 2017 municipal elections, as well as three criminal proceedings initiated in 2017 – one for disclosing official secrets due to negligence, one for
disclosing confidential information and one for illegal possession of firearms components and ammunition. Also transferred were three criminal proceedings initiated in 2016 - for spying, for deliberately disclosing official secrets and for use of forged documents and concealing one’s identity – as well as two criminal proceedings initiated in 2015 – for illegal participation in the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

In the last year, DP closed 15 criminal proceedings on its books. Of these, in 11 cases the statute of limitations had expired, three cases were closed due to lack of evidence of criminality, while one case was closed due to lack of evidence. DP transferred one more criminal proceeding to the State Police pursuant to competency.

In 2017, DP received and acted on three requests for mutual legal assistance from foreign law enforcement bodies.

At the beginning of 2018, DP had 79 criminal proceedings on its books, including 20 criminal proceedings initiated in 2017, seven in 2016, ten in 2015, and 42 in 2014 or earlier.

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

- In 2016, the Saeima adopted amendments to the Criminal Law which are significant for national security. These amendments allow the service to use criminal law instruments against persons gathering information in Latvia on behalf of a foreign intelligence and security service. Considering that, according to the information available to DP, there is no evidence that activities by Russia’s intelligence and security services against Latvia have diminished, henceforth DP’s top priority will be crimes connected with spying and uncovering and preventing illegal actions with official secrets.

- As with last year’s municipal elections, the 2018 Saeima elections will also demand the commitment of significant resources by DP in accordance with its competences in both counterintelligence and pre-trial investigation to ensure the elections are free and fair. DP considers that interfering with the right to vote is one of the most significant threats to the democratic order, as free and honest elections are pillars of our constitutional order.
- Travelling by Latvian residents to armed conflict zones for the purpose of joining criminal organisations continues to pose significant risks for Latvia’s national security. Therefore, DP will continue to prioritise the investigation of such cases and bringing guilty persons to justice. Noteworthy amendments were also made last year to the National Security Law, under which travel bans can be imposed on persons planning to participate in armed conflicts, terrorist activities or other activities outside Latvia which provide grounds for believing that the person will threaten national security after returning to Latvia. The said amendments will allow the service to act preventatively when necessary.

- Despite the fact that the terrorism threat level in Latvia remains low, DP has uncovered cases of individuals not only considering to travel to Syria to join Daesh or other terrorist-related criminal organisations, but also being involved in disseminating the propaganda of such organisations. The experience of other countries affirms that it is vital to restrict terrorist propaganda to prevent such crimes. At the time of publishing this report, the Saeima had passed the second reading of important amendments to the Criminal Law, which would create a separate section for terrorism-related offences, including making it a criminal offence to publicly praise or justify terrorism or to disseminate materials praising or justifying terrorism. The adoption of these amendments will allow DP to fight terrorist propaganda activities with criminal law methods, thereby reducing their associated risks.
7. Dignitary Protection

DP is responsible for protecting the Speaker of the Saeima (Parliament) of the Republic of Latvia and the Prime Minister, as well as ensuring the security of officials of foreign governments and international organisations on visits to Latvia\(^{12}\). DP is also responsible for coordinating security at high-level events involving dignitaries under DP’s protection, which is performed in close cooperation with other state and municipal bodies. DP must also protect officials who are suddenly under threat as well as when instructed by the Cabinet of Ministers or the Saeima.

The security measures organised and regularly performed by DP or by involving other state and municipal institutions may encompass bodyguard escorts, vehicle escorts, home security, workplace security, security of temporary residences, as well as surveillance of unsanctioned obtaining of information. All measures are planned and implemented based on threat analysis conducted by the service, in accordance with which concrete security measures, their scope and procedure for implementation are selected.

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\(^{12}\) Security for the President of the Republic of Latvia and dignitaries of foreign governments and international organisations is provided by the National Armed Forces Military Police.
During the reporting period, DP provided security for the Speaker of the Saeima of Republic of Latvia and the Prime Minister on a daily basis, when they attended public events as well as on foreign visits. DP provided security for the Speaker on nine foreign and five national trips, and 21 foreign and ten national trips for the Prime Minister. DP also provided security during visits to Latvia by 40 dignitaries from foreign governments, international organisations and institutions. Compared with the previous two years (in 2015 Latvia held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, while in 2016 it was responsible for events under the Nordic-Baltic Eight and Visegrad group formats as well as the “16+1” meeting between Central and Eastern European leaders and their Chinese counterparts), last year saw fewer international events. However, every year ensuring the success of visits by Latvia’s international partners becomes more complex, due to both high terrorism threat levels in the home countries of the foreign dignitaries, as well as ongoing conflicts in international relations which affect the security situation.

It is also worth noting that security measures are not provided in every case where these are requested by the relevant institutions or their representatives. After evaluating the existence of threats or their nature, DP may in some cases decline to provide security. Last year, it declined to provide security in six cases, wherein it was decided not to hinder the everyday lives of residents since analysis by DP did not indicate possible threats.

Last year, DP was also responsible for providing security at 14 events of varying scales in Latvia, during which security was ensured both for the respective events as well as for Latvian dignitaries and their invited foreign guests. In 2017, the service was also involved in providing security for a number of other national events in which dignitaries under DP’s protection took part.

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13 DP provides security for heads of foreign parliaments and governments, ministers of foreign affairs, as well as leaders of the United Nations, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission. DP provides security for other representatives of foreign countries at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Saeima administration.
With the increasing terrorism threat level, in particular in Western Europe, also the amount of security measures to ensure the security of foreign dignitaries and representatives of international organisations from terrorism risk countries is increasing. In such cases the aim of the security measures is not only the dignitary protection, but also the security of Latvia’s society.

There is no reason to believe that the scope of security measures to be performed will decrease in the near future.

At the same time, in future DP will seek to conduct security measures with as little impact as possible on residents’ daily lives.

The most important events of 2018 which will demand the commitment of DP’s resources will be events connected with Latvia’s centenary celebrations, which will be attended by officials from Latvia as well as high-ranking officials and representatives from foreign governments and international organisations and institutions.